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ACCIDENT REPORT
BATTLEMENT CREEK FIRE
FATALITIES AND INJURY
JULY 17, 1976
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
STATE OF COLORADO
GRAND JUNCTION DISTRICT
SUBMITTED BY:
ACCEPTED BY:
Jack F. Wilson
Robert W, Mutch
Edward G. Heilman
Curt Berkland
Director
Bureau of Land Management
U. S. Department, of the Interior
Aohn R. McGuire
Chief
Forest Service
U. S. Department of Agriculture
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FOREWORD
This investigation report covers an accident which occurred July 17,
1976, in the Grand Junction District of the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) in Colorado. Three firefighters were killed and a fourth severely
burned while working on the Battlement Creek fire approximately 40 miles
northeast of Grand Junction, Colorado (fig. 1). All victims were
members of a trained Forest Service (FS) fire crew stationed at Mormon
Lake on the Coconino National Forest near Flagstaff, Arizona.
The victims were:
Anthony A. Czak, 25, Flagstaff, Arizona
Scott L. Nelson, 22, Bloomer, Wisconsin
Stephen H. Furey, 23, Salmon, Idaho
The fourth victim, although severely burned, is expected to recover
fully. He is John C. Gibson, 27, of Wellsville, New York.
The accident occurred during a burnout operation along a ridge
above the fire in a steep drainage. The crew did not recognize the
danger; they were in until their planned primary escape route was cut
off by a run of the fire from below them. This report will discuss
in depth the multiple factors which contributed to this unfortunate
accident.
Although unrelated to' the Mormon Lake crew fatalities, another
death occurred on the Battlement Creek fire: when a B-26 air tanker
crashed and burned on July 16, killing the pilot. This accident is
reported in a separate report.
- 1 -
CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD 1
X. EVENTS PRIOR TO ACCIDENT 4
A. Location 4
B. National Fire Situation 4
C. Fire Environment 6
1. Weather 6
2. Topography 7
3. Vegetation and Fuels 13
D. Origin and Initial Suppression Effort 18
II. FIRE BEHAVIOR AND BURNING SEQUENCE ON 24
JULY 16 AND 17, 1976
A. General Situation 24
B. Prior Weather 28
C. Fire Behavior Appraisal 36
D. Fire Behavior July 16 36
E. Burning Sequence July 17 37
F. chaparral Model Nomograph 47
G. Fire Behavior Summary 48
III. SUPPRESSION EFFORT AND ACCIDENT SEQUENCE 50
A. Accident Sequence 50
B. Post-Accident Rescue and Medical Action 61
IV. INVESTIGATION 65
V. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 71
A. Fire Overhead and Crew Assignments 71
7/16-7/17/76
B. Overhead Qualification and Experience 75
C. Crew Qualification and Experience 80
D. Logistical Support 84
E. Fire Planning and Intelligence 84
F. Aviation Management Activity 85
VI. FINDINGS 89
A. Mechanical Factors 89
B. Physical Factors 89
C. Human Factors 90
1. Crew 90
2. Overhead 91
D. Management Factors 91
VII.
APPENDIX
Figure 1.
MAP
Western Colorado is experiencing an unusually severe fire season
caused partly by unusual fuel conditions and heavy lightning activity
during dry weather. A severe frost on June 14, 1976, killed a high
percentage of the leaves on Gambel's oak, which is now a readily
available and dry fine fuel. The District has also experienced a
greater number of fire starts, which has taxed their fire control
capability in the past few weeks.
Under a national plan to exchange and utilize manpower and
equipment, the Forest Service crew was working on this Bureau of Land
Management fire. There were also people from the Forest Service in
supervisory positions.
The Director of the Bureau of Land Management and Chief of the
Forest Service appointed an interagency investigation team under the
co-chairmanship of Jack Wilson, BLM, Director of the Boise Interagency
Fire Center (BIFC) , and Max Peterson, Deputy Chief for Programs and
Legislation of the Forest Service (FS). Other team members were:
Clyde O'Dell, Boise (Idaho) BIFC Fire Weather Meteorologist, National
Weather Service; Ed Heilman, Director of Fire Management, Northern
Region, Forest Service; Robert Mutch, Research Forester (Fire Behavior
and Fuels), Northern Forest Fire Laboratory, Forest Service; James
Abbott, Fire Training and Safety Specialist, Washington Office, Forest
Service; and Harold Baer, Attorney, Solicitor ' s Office, Department of
Interior, Denver.
Instructions to the team through the co-chairmen were to determine
the conditions and circumstances that led to the fatalities and injury
on the Battlement Creek fire.
3 -
I. EVENTS PRIOR TO ACCIDENT
A. Location
The fire occurred approximately 40 miles northeast of Grand
Junction, Colorado, in the Battlement Creek drainage, Sections
11, 12, 13, 14 and 23, T7S, R95W. It consumed 880 acres in
3 days: July 15, 16 and 17, 1976. At the time of the accident,
13 crews totalling 270 men and approximately 20 overhead were
assigned to the fire. (See Section I-D for initial suppression
effort by the Grand Valley Volunteer Fire Department on July 11.)
The Grand Junction District of the Bureau of Land Management
was responsible for suppression of the fire. Fire suppression
support and capability is newly organized this year around
the Grand Junction Fire Center (BLM) located at Walker Field
(the commercial airport) in Grand Junction. This Center serves
all BLM lands in western Colorado with a complement of crews,
helicopters and air tankers. The Fire Center, under Colorado
State Office supervision, has 1 full-time employee, 9 seasonal
employees, 2 fire management specialist assistants (detailed
from BIFC) , 30 trained firefighters from the San Luis Valley,
Colorado, crews, and one 12-man helitack crew (detailed from
the Forest Service) .
B. National Fire Situation
On July 15, there were 198 fires reported on the Daily Fire
Situation Report from BIFC. The majority of the fires were
in California, Nevada, and Utah. The only fire requiring
- 4 -
interregional support was the Ishawooa fire on the Shoshone
National Forest, which used air tanker No. 56 and 60 Missoula
smokejumpers. Utah BLM had a large fire southwest of Salt
Lake City. During this day, the Grand Junction District
worked on three fires, including the Battlement Creek fire.
On July 16, the number of fires increased to' 242, but
more importantly extensive dry lightning occurred in California,
Nevada, and Utah. The Battlement Creek fire and the Wickahoney
fire in the Boise District of the BLM (1,590 acres) required
mobilization of considerable resources. Initial attack forces
in most areas of California and Utah were heavily taxed, but
were successful in containing most of the fires.
On July 17, as an aftermath of the lightning storms the
prior afternoon, 458 fires were reported, and red flag warnings
were forecast in central California. Of the 458 fires, 384 of
them were in California. The Battlement Creek fire was the only
one drawing on BIFC support, although several large restock
orders were processed through the fire warehouse from other
areas .
This situation continued through Sunday, July 18, when
425 fires were reported. Again, 352 of these were in California,
with Sequoia and Yosemite National Parks catching 120 of these
fires. There were no major support actions from BIFC or any
other caches outside the fire areas.
- 5 -
In brief summary, the national picture shows a fairly
busy initial attack situation with few large fires materializing,
and most of these not drawing on outside resources to any
extent. A large supply of crews, aircraft of all kinds
(except heavy helicopters), overhead, radio equipment, and fire
supplies were available.
C. Fire Environment
1. Weather
The most basic meteorological conclusion that can be drawn
from available meteorological data and extensive interviews
with personnel assigned on the Battlement Creek fire,
Saturday, July 17, is that the accident was not directly
weather related; i.e., there were no thunderstorms in the
immediate fire vicinity between 1400 and 1500 m.d.t.
that could have produced downdrafts to affect the fire,
no unusual or abnormal winds occurred attributable to
accepted meteorological causes such as fronts, low level
jet stream, or .locally induced dust devils, etc.
At the time of the accident, the .atmosphere was
unstable, normal up-slope winds were occurring, winds
aloft were generally light SW and ranged from 5-15 m.p.h.
from 6,600 feet to 31,000 feet m.s.l.
Observers on the fire at the time of the accident
reported high winds at ground level 25-35 m.p.h. and above.
- 6 -
Earlier in the day, the weather was described as fair,
winds were light both on the ridge and on lower portions of
the fire. Some small whirl activity was reported about
1230-1300 m.d.t. which would indicate unstable atmospheric
conditions. Figure 2 illustrates the morning and afternoon
soundings for Grand Junction, Colorado, on Saturday,
July 17, 1976. They illustrate typical summertime conditions
of afternoon low-level heating and instability. Generally
observers reported high winds at the time of, or just
before, the accident. These were very likely local fire-
induced winds generated by very intense burning and rapid
rate of spread.
A rather severe frost on June 14 (23-27°F. in the
6,200-9,000-foot range) produced extensive damage to
Gambel's oak stands in the fire area. The frost was an
important indirect weather-related event which Increased
the dry fuel available for combustion by killing leaves
in the oak stands. Relatively warm, dry weather following
the frost provided conditions conducive to drying dead
plant tissue.
2, Topography
Origin of the fire was 40 airline miles NE of Grand Junction,
Colorado, and 1-1/2 miles south of the Colorado River in
the Battlement Creek drainage. Battlement Creek is
approximately 8 miles long and flows in a northwesterly
-7-
direction to the Colorado River. The fire burned entirely
on the east side of Battlement Creek (fig. 3) . The topography
varies from relatively level land along the drainage bottom
to rugged mountain slopes. Elevations on the fire range
from 6,200 feet near the origin to 8,400 feet near the site
where the men died. The fire burned primarily on north-
facing aspects on Thursday, July 15, and Friday morning, and
on west-facing aspects on Friday afternoon and Saturday.
The slopes that burned on Saturday were fully exposed to
prevailing southwesterly air flow; and they received direct
solar heating from 1100 on. Slopes that burned on Saturday,
July 17, ranged from 10 percent above the road to 75 percent
in the chute just below the ridgeline. The side drainage
that burned out on Saturday was characterized by two major
draws, aligned in an east-west direction. The head of the
north draw was about 3,500 feet northeast of the Battlement
Creek road. This draw terminated just below a saddle on the
ridgeline where the Mormon Lake crew was working on Saturday.
The south draw climbs in an easterly direction for 3,200
feet from the road. Side slopes of these draws were
measured at 50-60 percent.
Visibility to the west from the saddle above the north
draw was restricted due to the topography. The slope
west of the ridgetop in the saddle was gradual for about
140 feet and then broke off steeply (fig. 4).
- 9 -
UKM
Crash
Crew Accident S
Oblique
gure 4. — Profile in saddle of main ridge above north draw
3. Vegetation and Fuels
The vegetation of Battlement Creek reflects the arid climate.
The dominant vegetation in the fire area is Gambel's oak-
mountain mahogany. But vegetational types in the drainage
vary according to elevation and exposure. On north-
facing slopes, the vegetation begins at the stream bottoms
with a mixture of pinon-jdniper and sagebrush. As the
elevation increases, the sagebrush decreases, and a mixed
mountain shrub type gradually replaces pinon- juniper .
Grass and sagebrush types are common on the ridges and
drainage bottoms (cured cheatgrass was present in openings
at lower elevations) . Aspen and spruce-fir may be found
at lower elevations along draws and moist areas . Some
aspen occurred in the fire area at the head of the south
draw; and prostrate Douglas-fir was found along the high
ridge east of the south draw.
The mixed mountain shrub type was the primary plant
community contributing to fire spread on Saturday, July 17.
The dominant species in this community are Gambel's oak,
mountain mahogany, serviceberry , and snowberry. The shrub
community was dense and all but impenetrable in many places.
The shrubs contained a large amount of fine dead branches
throughout the canopy (fig. 5). Gambel's oak ranged as
high as 10-12 feet or higher; it was 4-6 feet high along
- 13 -
Figure 5. — Serviceberry , mountain mahogany, and Gambel's oak in the Battlement Greek fire contained
a large amount of fine, dead branches throughout the canopy.
the ridgeline above the chute (north draw) . This ridgeline,
the site of the accident, also contained several small
openings and game trails (fig. 6).
A very significant weather event occurred 1 month
prior to the fire which adversely affected the fuel
complex. An extensive frost on June 14 killed more than
50 percent of the leaves on the Gambel's oak (other shrub
species did not appear to be materially affected) . Many
of the dead leaves were still retained on the plants at
the time of the fire (fig. 7). Shedding oak leaves
contributed to a 1-2-inch litter layer beneath the mixed
mountain shrub type. Pinon pine and juniper trees were
scattered through the oak-mahogany type, primarily along
the ridge north of the north draw.
Fuel moisture samples were collected at 1830 on
July 20 at 8,800 feet on the ridge above the fire area:
Average moisture
Sample content (%)
Dead oak leaves (shrub canopy) 11.4
Leaf litter on ground 13.7
Dead oak branches (l/4-inch) 12.4
Green oak leaves 166.5
Living oak stems (1/4-inch) 193.8
The dead oak leaves in the shrub canopy and other fine
fuels could have been at 7-8 percent moisture content, or
less, at the time of the fire run on Saturday, July 17.
- 15 -
Figure 6. — The ridgeline where the fatalities occurred was characterized
by 4- to 6-foot brush, small openings, and game trails.
Oblique aerial photograph, July 19, 1976.
- 16 -
.
I
•vj
I
Figure 7. — Many of the frost-killed Gambel's oak leaves
were still retained in the shrub crowns at the
time of the fire.
The June frost significantly increased the amount of
available fuel in the Battlement Creek area by contributing
to the dieback of the oak leaves. One individual remarked
that fire behavior conditions seemed 2-3 weeks early for
this time of year.
Chemical analyses of the Gambel's oak leaves were
conducted at the Northern Forest Fire Laboratory in Missoula:
Green leaves
Dead leaves in crown
Crude fat (%)— ^
1.60
.52
Total ash (%)
3.18
2.50
Low heat of combustion
(B.t.u./lb.)^
7886
7782
Thus, the crude fat content, or amount of volatile waxes,
oils, and resins, was quite low. Much lower than the 8-12
percent reported for southern California chaparral.
D. Origin and Initial Suppression Effort
The action leading up to the time of BLM’s initial attack
on July 15, began 4 days earlier, July 12, on private land.
Sunday, July 11, a severe lightning storm struck the
Morrisania area late in the afternoon. Much of the lightning
activity occurred in the vicinity of the Fames Orchard. This
lightning activity was followed by what was described as a
i/ Samples were not frozen. Escape of volatiles might
tend to make these values low.
- 18 -
moderately heavy shower. Records indicated .06 rain fell in
the town of Grand Junction, Colorado, approximately 40 miles
southwest of the mesa lying in the Colorado River valley.
No fire was reported at that time.
On July 12, at approximately 1330, a fire was reported in
SE*s, NW%, Section 11, T7S, R95W, at Eames Orchard (fig. 8),
This fire was controlled by 1700 at 1/2 acre by the Grand
Valley Volunteer Fire Department. BLM air patrol (783) confirmed
the fire was no longer smoking at 1925.
At 2130, a lightning strike was observed by a local citizen
in approximately the same vicinity which resulted in an immediate
fire start. The Grand Valley Volunteer Fire Department responded
to this fire with five men and a ground tanker. They contained
the fire and returned home at 0300, July 13,
During the daylight hours of Tuesday and Wednesday,
July 13-14, a smoke surveillance was maintained of the area by
the captain of the Grand Valley Fire Department from his place
of employment and by other members of the department at varying
times .
On Thursday, July 15, at approximately 1400, smoke was
again noted in the area by the residents of the Eames Orchard,
and a call was placed to the Grand Valley Fire Department. Two
men from the Grand Valley Department responded, arriving at
the fire approximately 1430. They found the fire was again
in the same location they had taken action on twice the
- 19 -
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Figure 8
previous Monday. The two men were just starting suppression
action when an increase in wind velocity was noted. The fire
jumped about 20-30 feet to the south and southeast into sage
and chaatgrass fuels and spread rapidly. The pumper was
considered to be in danger and the men moved the vehicle and
radioed for assistance. The fire was gaining momentum and
velocity; the men decided to remain on the west side of the fire
and wet down that area with the water they had. The wind velocity
kept increasing at this time.
At approximately 1430, the Grand Valley Fire Chief went
to the north of the area on a higher mesa some 5 miles distant
and had the area in observation. He reported observing a
pattern of fire about 50 yards wide moving rapidly southeast.
The Grand Valley Fire Captain reported observing a cloud
of fire and smoke erupt from the area at a time of 1500. His
location was about 6 miles northeast of the fire,
Additional manpower and equipment were dispatched to
the scene by the Grand Valley Fire Department (time undetermined) .
At 1510, July 15, Wayne Fisher, BLM, radioed Grand Junction
Fire Dispatch a location on the fire from his visual observations
from some distance away.
Grand Junction District Fire Management Officer Roy
Johnson initiated BLM action at 1522 while on an aerial
observation flight. The initial order was for a retardant drop
- 21 -
and two helitack crews. An additional retardant drop was
ordered almost immediately. At approximately 1600, the Fire
Boss Jack Haslem, a local district employee, was alerted and
two. 2 0-man crews were ordered.
At 1548, BLM air tanker No. 59 was dispatched with an
ETA of 15 minutes and the county fire department had been advised
to clear a drop zone.
The Grand Valley crew on the fire reported the first
retardant drop at 1600. They had pulled back to the Eames
Orchard prior to arrival of the air tanker.
Several local pumper, volunteer, BLM and Forest Service
crews containued to work along parts of the fire the night of
July 15, Three air tankers, two 1,000-gallon B-26's and a
2,000-gallon C-119 worked hot spots until dark. The pumper-
crews patrolled the west side from midnight to 0600 July 16
to prevent the fire from crossing the road to the west.
From the beginning of suppression effort on July 15,
the attack strategy was designed to prevent western and southern
spread of the fire. The presence of natural gas lines and wells
to the west and Project Rulison to the south influenced this
decision. Later, on July 16, the fatal crash of an air
tanker near the fire was also an unusual event.
Project Rulison - This program was sponsored by Austtol
Oil of Houston, Texas, and Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories
- 22 -
tinder the supervision of the Atomic Energy Commission, It
was conducted to stimulate the natural gas pockets and facilitate
gas collection by underground nuclear explosions .
Remaining at the project site are two above-ground metal
holding tanks which contain some explosive vapors. Also
contained in the tanks is a small amount of material which
presents a low-level radiation problem. The well is closed
with plugs at the bottom and also the top of the shaft. The
valves have been closed and chain locked.
Plans are to close the site in the near future by removing
the tanks and cementing the shaft closed.
Aircraft Accident - On Friday, July 16, 1 day before the
crew accident, a B-26 air tanker crashed on a retardant dropping
mission on the Battlement Creek fire. The accident occurred
at 0856, approximately 1 mile south of the fire. The pilot
was killed.
The crash diverted the line boss and the Sawtooth interregional
crew for much of the day in controlling a fire at the crash site
and removing the pilot's remains.
Although this accident is not related directly to the crew
fatalities and injuries, it could be an indirect factor affecting
overhead attitude and response.
Although the line boss and one crew were diverted to the
crash site July 16, there were, however, no direct actions taken
on the Battlement Creek fire as a result of this aircraft accident.
- 23 -
II. FIRE BEHAVIOR AND BURNING SEQUENCE ON JULY 16 AND 17, 1976
A. General Situation
The large scale synoptic weather pattern over western Colorado
and the Battlement Creek fire area on Saturday, July 17, was
one of high pressure aloft and a very flat surface pressure
pattern associated with a poorly defined thermal low. A
large scale pattern of this type is conducive to generally
light wind flow where local effects dominate the weather
picture.
A low pressure area aloft situated off the central
California cost Saturday morning, July 17, (fig. 9) had weakened
and moved northeastward by Sunday morning, July 18, (fig. 10)
to the northern Nevada-California border. This increased free
air flow above 12,000 feet from a range of 2-15 m.p.h. at Grand
Junction Saturday at 0600 to 13-25 m.p.h. by 1800 (fig. 11).
Below 12,000 feet, winds decreased from the 5-16 m.p.h. range
to 1-8 m.p.h. during the same time period. Grand Junction is
about 40 air miles SW of the fire site, and winds aloft above
approximately 8,000-9,000 feet can be expected to be
representative of the fire area. This relatively weak upper
air flow permitted local terrain effects to dominate the wind
field in the fire area. The fire burned over an elevation
range of 6,200-8,400 feet m.s.l. on a steep, west-facing slope.
The accident occurred at approximately 8,200 feet m.s.l. Terrain
effects produced upslope afternoon winds 10-15 m.p.h., with
- 24 -
SUNDAY, JULY 18, 1976
July 17,
1976 , 0 6 00
m.d.t.
July 17,
1976, 1800
m.d.t.
Height
Direction
Velocity
Height
Direction
Velocity
Feet
Knots-i/
Feet
Knotsl/
5698
153
05
5791
292
07
6623
227
04
6715
282
05
7548
232
07
7639
259
02
8473
238
10
8552
128
02
9385
254
13
9365
127
01
10297
260
14
10177
213
02
11232
265
14
11028
204
06
12173
276
11
11896
203
11
13114
271
07
12764
207
15
14055
203
05
13632
202
17
14998
165
08
14542
196
16
15943
149
09
15477
188
13
16888
137
09
16533
179
13
17912
113
08
17636
176
14
18868
081
08
18730
176
15
19822
087
05
19797
174
14
20903
119
02
20955
169
13
24779
230
13
25438
220
15
29862
294
09
30219
242
22
30938
290
13
34651
256
33
35889
276
33
40727
274
40
40057
288
37
—I To convert knots to m.p.h., multiply knots x 1.15.
Figure 11. — Upper wind measurements at Grand Junction,
Colorado.
higher gusts. These velocity values are based on measured
upper winds at Grand Junction and on untrained observer
estimates. No on-site fire weather measurements were made
prior to the accident. Intense burning increased these wind
values for a short period of time and account for higher
estimates by observers. Surface winds recorded at Grand
Junction and Rifle on July 16 and 17 are illustrated in
the table below.
B. Prior Weather
The climate of the fire area is classified as arid. Mean
annual and May-September precipitation are illustrated below
for several locations in northwestern Colorado.
Grand Glenwood
Aspen
Craig
Junction
Rifle
Gunnison
Springs
Mean
annual
(inches)
18.67
13.42
8.41
10.93
11.0
18.03
May-
Sept.
7.09
6.04
4.32
4.58
5.36
6.99
The
values
for the
fire area
itself
are estimated to be
16-20 inches mean annual and 8-9 inches May through September
based on NOAA. isohyetal precipitation analysis maps (1931-60) .
Precipitation records for 1976 indicate Grand Junction was
somewhat below normal while Rifle was somewhat above. The
fire area lies between these two stations but much higher and
closer to Rifle. Precipitation on the fire site was most likely
- 28 -
very near normal. Monthly distribution of precipitation
for 1976 at stations in the vicinity of the fire is illustrated
below:
Grand Junction Rifle Grand Valley
Pcpn
Departure
Pc2n
Departure
Pcpn
Jan.
.13
-.51
.52
-.40
.26
Feb.
.81
+ .20
1.81
+1.05
1.56
Mar.
.75
±0
M
M
1.53
April
.38
-.41
.89
-.04
-
May
1.49
+ .86
-
-
-
June
.14
-.41
-
-
-
July-17 th
.14
i
•
i— 1
CO
-
-
-
Season
to date
3.84
-.45
-
-
-
Mean maximum temperatures for warm months in northwestern
Colorado are illustrated below:
Aspen
7913 ft
Craig
6280 ft
Grand Jet.
4843 ft
Rifle
5319 ft
Gunnison
7694 ft
Glenwood
Spgs .
5823 ft
May
63.8
68.2
86.0
75.0
67.2
73.2
June
73.7
77.7
98.0
84.5
77.5
83.3
July
79.8
85.9-
99.0
91.2
83.5
90.0
Aug.
77,8
83.4
98.0
88.5
80.5
87.0
Sept.
71.6
75.4
93.0
81.2
75.2
80.4
July is the month with the highest average maximum temperature.
These July normals can be seen to be similar to observed
maximum temperatures before and on the day of the fire accident
as illustrated below:
- 29 -
Grand
Glenwood
Junction
Rifle
Springs
Gunnison
July 14
Max.
98
91
92
84
Min.
i- •
July 15
Max.
97
91
93
83
Min.
60
49
51
42
(.01)
July 16
Max.
99
92
M
86
Min.
65
48
M
. 44
(.04)
July 17
Max.
97
95
M
•"
Min.
70
52
M
46
Note that Gunnison received light precipitation (.01 and
.04 inch) on July 15 and 16.
Weather was described on the fire Saturday, July 17,
as being fair and hot. This is reasonable in view of the
observed temperatures at. Grand Junction and Rifle reaching
into the mid and upper 90* s.
The freeze of June
14 mentioned
earlier was widespread
over western Colorado.
The minimums
observed were:
°F.
Elevation
Grand Junction
34
4843 ft
Rifle
32
5319 ft
Eagle
32
6600 ft
Gunnison
23
7694 ft
Montrose
36
5794 ft
Steamboat Springs
27
6695 ft
30 -
With the fire elevation well above most of these stations,
it is reasonable and conservative to estimate minimum temperatures
in the 23-27 p F. range. Palmer drought values for western
Colorado are in the normal range indicating little stress on
vegetation. The occurrence Qf the freeze, therefore, becomes
more important from the point of view of altering normal
vegetative condition.
Since no direct on-site weather observations were available
from the fire, the next best choice was to go to nearby stations.
Rifle and Grand Junction weather is illustrated below;
July 16, 1976
Grand Junction Rifle
M.d.t.
CldCovr
Temp
£2.
Wind
CldCovr
Temp
DP
Wind
0545
Clr
68
27
NE/12
Clr
51
38
NE/4
0845
1/10
78
37
E3E/11
3/10
66
46
Calm
1145
2/10
93
43
SE/6
3/10
81
49
Calm
1445
3/10
95
45
W/10
4/10
91
55
N/6
1745
3/10
96
31
WSW/7
3/10
81
60
Calm
2045
7/10
89
36
ESE/4
2/10
71
56
N/7
2345
—
’- 31 “
July 17, 1976
Grand Junction Rifle
M.d.t.
CldCovr
Temp
DP
Wind
CldCovr
Temp
DP
Wind
0545
1/10
70
42
E/7
Missing
0845
4/10
75
45
ESE/6
4/10
65
52
N/3
1145
2/10
88
45
ESE/3
2/10
84
42
S/5
1445
4/10
94
47
W/8
Cb ALQDS
K ALG MTS
4/10
93
55
NE/4 Cb SE
1745
9/10
91
45
W/7 K
and RWU
T HVY cu
10/10
84
50
N/7 Virga
ALQDS
2045
10/10
71
56
$E/5
10/10
74
52
SE/ 8 Cb
ALQDS
T SW
2345
10/10
64
59
WSW/9
10/10
69
43
NW/4
There was some question on July 17 between 1400 and 1500
m.d.t. of the possibility of a thunderstorm near the fire. The
remarks from Rifle at 1445 indicate a cumulonimbus cloud to
the southeast. This point was very carefully checked with
National Weather Service radar observations at the same time.
Echoes were replotted and the closest echo to the fire as
reported by the Rock Springs radar was about 8 miles north-
northeast of Rifle at 1435 MDT on July 17, 1976. Allowing for
extremes in errors in observation and plotting, it would be
very difficult to place a significant thunderstorm west of Rifle
and near the fire at that time. Based on these observations and
- 32 -
most observers on the fire, a thunderstorm downdraft has been
ruled out as a possible contributing factor. Forecasts issued
from Denver for Saturday, July 17, are illustrated verbatim
below. They called for Showers and thunderstorms in western
Colorado which did, in fact, occur.
COLORADO ZONES
C001 !
COOS
CO 10
ISSUED 4 AH MDT SAT 7/17/76
FAIR TO PARTLY CLOUDY WITH WIDELY SCATTERED AFTERNOON AND EVENING
SHOWERS OR THUNDERSTORMS TODAY. MOSTLY CLOUDY AND LITTLE
COOLER SUNDAY WITH SHOWERS OR THUNDERSTORMS SCATTERED.
HIGH TODAY 85 TO 95- LOW TONIGHT 50 TO 65. HIGH SUNDAY 80
TO 90. WIND VARIABLE 5 TO 15 MPH EXCEPT GUSTY NEAR THUNDERSHOWERS.
PROBABILITY OF PRECIP 20 PERCENT TODAY 30 PERCENT TONIGHT
40 PERCENT SUNDAY. $$
ZCZC
DEN FP1 171010
FPUS1 KDEN 171010
ISSUED 4AM SATURDAY
COLORADO
FAIR TO PARTLY CLOUDY AND CONTINUED WARM OVER STATE TODAY WITH
WIDELY SCATTERED AFTERNOON AND EVENING THUNDERSTORMS .. SOME
HEAVY IN EAST PORTION TODAY. SHOWERS AND THUNDERSHOWERS INCREASING
OVER MOUNTAINS AND WEST SUNDAY WITH WIDELY SCATTERED THUNDERSTORMS
EAST. A LITTLE COOLER MOUNTAINS . .WEST- -AND NORTHEAST SUNDAY.
HIGH TODAY UPPER 80S TO UPPER 90S EAST. .85 TO 95 WEST WITH
75 TO 85 MOUNTAINS. LOW TONIGHT IN LOWER 60S EAST. .50 TO 65
WEST WITH 40S AND UPPER 30S MOUNTAINS. HIGHS SUNDAY AROUND
90 EAST.. 80 TO 90 WEST . .WITH MOSTLY 70S MOUNTAINS.
EAKIN..WSFO DENVER
- 33 -
COLORADO FIRE WEATHER MORNING MAP DISCUSSION
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE DENVER CO
845 AM MDT SAT JUL 17 1976
HIGH PRESSURE RIDGE ALOFT STILL DOMINATES REGION. .HOWEVER A CUT
OFF LOW IS DRIFTING EASTWARD OFF THE CENTRAL CALIFORNIA COAST.
ABUNDANT MOISTURE IS SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE WESTERN U.S. AND
WILL SLOWLY BE MOVING INTO COLORADO OVER THE WEEKEND.
SHOWERS AND THUNDERSTORMS WIDELY SCATTERED IN WESTERN HALF OF
STATE TODAY.. MORE NUMEROUS SOUTHERN MOUNTAINS. ONLY ISOLATED
ACTIVITY LIKELY ALONG. EAST SLOPES. TEMPERATURES A LITTLE
COOLER WEST TODAY OTHERWISE LITTLE CHANGE. NO SIGNIFICANT
WINDS EXCEPT GUSTY NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.
OUTLOOK FOR SUNDAY. .. INCREASING SHOWER AND THUNDERSTORM ACTIVITY
OVER MOUNTAINS AND WEST AND COOLER,
SMOKE DISPERSLA GOOD TO VERY GOOD.
LARI SON WSFO DENVER
ZCZC
DEN FP1 171620 AMD
FPUS1 KDEN 171620 AMD
ISSUED 10 AM SATURDAY
COLORADO .UPDATED FORECAST
WIDELY SCATTERED SHOWERS AND THUNDERSTORMS MOUNTAINS AND WEST
TODAY INCREASING SUNDAY. CLEAR TO PARTLY CLOUDY THROUGH SUNDAY
EAST WITH ISOLATED AFTERNOON AND EVENING SHOWERS AND THUNDER-
STORMS. SLIGHT COOLING TREND WEST THROUGH SUNDAY. HIGH TODAY
AND SUNDAY 80S AND LOW 90S WEST UPPER 80S AND 90S EAST WITH
60S AND 70S MOUNTAINS. LOW TONIGHT UPPER SOS AND 60S WITH
40 S MOUNTAINS
A thunderstorm occured at Rifle in the evening of July 17
(2040 m.d.t.) and .04 inch of precipitation was recorded.
Ten-hour time lag fuel moisture was in the 3-5 percent
range for several stations in the week preceding the accident
(fig. 12).
- 34 -
10-Hour Time Lag Fuel Moisture (Percent)
Colorado
National
Monument
Mesa
Verde
Grand
Junction
Gould
Eagle
FAA
Artesia
Nucla
July 8, 1976
4
4
6
3
3
July 9, 1976
4
5
3
5
7'
,3 ' :
3
July 10, 1976
3
7
3
6
4
■ 3
3
July 11, 1976
4
7
4
5
4
3
3
July 12, 1976
5
8
3
4
5'
2
4
July 13, 1976
9
6
8
11
7
3
5
July 14, 1976
5
6
5
5
5
2
5
July 15, 1976
4
-
4
-
6
3
4
July 16, 1976
-
6
-
6
-
-
July 17, 1976
4
10
-
5
6
3
4
July 18, 1976
8
-
12
7
6
21
7
July 19, 1976
14
40
11
27
13
5
8
Figure 12.
Showers at isolated points temporarily increased fuel
moisture to as much as 11 percent. Generally, however, fuels
dried rapidly back to the 3-5 percent range.
C. Fire Behavior Appraisal
A rather typical weather pattern, steep mountainous terrain,
and frost-induced dieback in Garabel's oak established
conditions for high rates of fire spread in the Battlement
Creek drainage during afternoon hours. For these reasons
there might be a tendency to equate the Battlement Creek fire
with a southern California brush fire, but such was not quite
the case. Precipitation amounts were near normal for this
time of year, humidities were not unusually low, and wind
velocities generally fell far short of Santa Ana conditions.
Green fuel moistures for oak leaves and stems were 166 percent
and 194 percent, respectively, well above the 60 percent moisture
contents recorded for drought-stressed chaparral in California.
Nevertheless, dead oak leaves on the ground and in the crowns,
abundant fine dead branches in the oak and mountain mahogany
crowns, the dense arrangement of 6- to 12-foot shrubs, and slopes
ranging from 50-75 percent provided all the potential necessary
for a fast-spreading, high-intensity fire.
D. Fire Behavior July 16
The major fire behavior on the day before the tragedy apparently
resulted from a hooking action down toward the road and a
subsequent run uphill in oakbrush to the ridgeline. This side
36 -
drainage lies just north of the drainage that burned out on
Saturday. The run on Friday burned out a major portion of
the drainage (from the mad east to the ridge top) in about
30 minutes. Fire whirls were associated with this run which
occurred between 1600 and 1700 (fig. 13) .
Friday afternoon's fire behavior was, impressive. On
Saturday it was considered- important to prevent the fire from
crossing the road- and catline and getting into the large
drainage to the southwest. Also a key part of the line to
.. hold on Saturday was the 1,800-foot stretch from the rocky
bluff to the helispot,
On Friday a catline was constructed down the ridge of
the next side drainage (A-C, fig. 14). This line was burned
out during Friday afternoon; the burning out operation also
proceeded along the road from the cattleguard (C, fig. 14)
north to the bend in the road (D, fig. 14).
E . Burning Sequence July 17
There were very few smokes visible in the area north of the
catline on Saturday morning — perhaps a few along the road
and on the ridge above the bend in the road .
The plans fpr Saturday's day shift were to mopup along the
catline (A-C) and main road (C-D) and burn out the unburned
fuel (A-D) . The Mormon lake crew was to improve and bum out
the line from the rocky bluff to the helispot (E-G) and move
into the black area when unbiirned fuels were fired out from below.
- 37 -
Figure 13. — The spectacular fire behavior on Friday
afternoon, July 16, was highlighted by the
activity of fire whirls.
- 38 -
INDIVIDUAL FIRE REPORT
ACCIDENT sit
turnout
Direction
usees thro;
Fig. 14 . Burnout operation on Saturday, July 17, 1976, by Mormon Lake and Happy
Jack crews. Happy Jack crew burned out from point "A" to point "C" between 0900
and 1200. They burned out inside the black of the previous day's burnout. The
dashed area at the base of the north draw was burned out between 1230 and 1315.
Meanwhile, the Mormon Lake crew was improving and burning out the line in the
saddle above the north draw between 1100 and 1400+. ( = burnout path;
X's = burnout crew; H = helispot) . _,q_
It is important to account for the burning out operations
on Saturday because these operations materially contributed
to the fire behavior situation.
The Happy Jack crew started burning out from the rocky
bluff at 0900. They proceeded downhill along the edge of the
previous day's burnout north of the catline (arriving at the
road. Point C, at 1200) . The same crew burned out above the
bend in the road between 1230 and 1315 (fig. 14). Meanwhile
the Mormon Lake crew at the top of the draw was improving the
line between the rocky bluff (Point E) and the helispot (Point G)
and attempting to burn it out. Line improvement and burning out
took place between 1300 and 1400 along the ridgeline. The
burning out on top did not go well; the fuels did not sustain
good fire spread.
Everyone in the Happy Jack burnout squad was back on the
road at 1315, Their burnout fires began burning well about
1300 (fig. 15) and moved up the south draw first and then worked
onto the ridge and into the north draw. A photograph taken
from a Cessna 210 at about 1420 shows the fire on the spur
ridge between the two draws and below the burned island (fig- 16).
Thus, it took over an hour for the fire to burn half way up
the slope. The fire then must have burped into the upper end of.
the steep north draw and burned rapidly to the helispot by 1430.
A photograph taken about 1430 from the rocky bluff by Mormon Lake
crew member John Meyers shows the fire burning towards the helispot
- 40 -
Figure 15. — The burnout fires above the road on Saturday,
July 17, began to produce abundant smoke at
1300. This view looks north from fire camp.
Figure 16. — This view of the convection column was photographed by an
aerial observer at 1420 on Saturday during a Cessna 210
flight from Eagle to Grand Junction. The column is
centered on the ridge between the north and south draws
and positioned about half way between the road and the
ridgeline where Mormon Lake crew was working.
before burning under the rocky bluff (fig. 17) . The Bell 212
helicopter pilots observed a slightly delayed run around the
unburned island and up the south draw, hooking around the point
of the rocky bluff (fig. 18). The four members of the Mormon
Lake crew were lying in the fireline near the point of the rocky
bluff. The fire probably reached their position about 1435-
1440 (fig. 19). Thus, the fire travelled about 3,600 feet
(scaled horizontal distance— from the base of the north draw
uphill and easterly to the ridgetop — C-D to F-G, fig. 14)
in 1-1/2 hours.
Although generally light, upslope winds were observed earlier
in the day, reports had winds increasing substantially between
1350 and 1445 (probably gusting to 20-30 m.p.h.). The winds
induced by the main fire whipped up the burnout fires in the
saddle between the rocky bluff and the helispot, further
threatening the upslope escape route the four squad members
followed. John Meyers reported flame heights 25-30 feet above
the shrubs when the fire came through the saddle. Flames were
at a low angle and elongated.
At 1445, the Bell 206-B helicopter pilot observed from
a distance of about 20 miles a vertical convection column over
the Battlement Greek fire with a "nuclear explosion" type cap
on top. He estimated the convection column height at 16,000
feet m.s.l. (the same height as the tops of cumulus clouds in
- 43 -
44-
Figure 17. — Mormon Lake crew member John Meyers photographed the fire
running towards the lower helispot at about 1430 on
Saturday, July 17. This photograph was taken from the
rocky bluff looking north. This is the fire run that
stopped the burnout squad from joining the line
improvement squad in the safety zone beyond the flames.
Fig.l8~Fire run sequence on Saturday, July 17, 1976. Smoke began to build above
road at 1300. The fire ran up the south draw first and was below the unburned
island at 1400-1415. The next run was up the north draw, burning to the ridgeline
in the saddle at about 1430. The fatal burning across the point of the rocky bluff
(Point "E") occurred about 1435-1440.
- 45 -
Figure 19. — Helicopter crew searching for missing Mormon Lake crew
members right after fire burned across Point E at the
base of the rocky bluff. Crew boss Czak and crew
members Furey, Nelson, and Gibson had been lying in
the ridgetop fireline just to the right and below
the helicopter. This picture probably taken about
1500 on July 17, 1976
- 46 -
the area) . The convection column was visible from the airport
at Grand Junction.
The fire burned across the saddle in a couple of places.
But it was essentially contained on the ridgetop by the handline,
natural openings, and earlier retardant drops.
F . Chaparral Model Nomograph
Site conditions on Saturday afternoon were run using the
chaparral fuel model—/ of the National Fire-Danger Rating System
with nomographs designed to predict fire spread, intensity,
and flame length. Two different windspeeds (15 and 25 m.p.h.)
and three slope percents (40, 60, and 75) were used in cal-
culations. Dead fuel moisture was set at 5.5 percent and live
fuel moisture at 150 percent. Nomograph results;
Condition
1
2
3
Windspeed (m.p.h.)
15
15
25
Slope (percent)
40
60
75
Effective wind (m.p.h.)
17
18
29
Reaction intensity
12,000
12,000
12,000
(B.t.u./min./ft. 2 ) i
Rate of spread (ch./hr.)
110
125
240
Flame length (ft.)
20-30
20-30
30-40
Fire line intensity
5,500
6,000
12,000
(B. t.u. /sec. /f t.)
Time to go 1/2 mile (mih.)
24
21
11
Time to go 3/4 mile (mih.)
36
32
16
Conditions 1, 2, and 3 ^represent the lower slope, mid-slope,
and the upper portion of steep chute, respectively, Condition 3
also is characterized by a 25 m.p.h. windspeed to reflect
2 /
— Fire-Danger Rating System fuel model B was selected because
it came closest to representing oakbrush conditions on the Battle-
ment Creek fire.
- 47 -
probable peak gusts.. Conditions 1, 2, and 3 show the fire
traveling 1/2 mile in 11~26 minutes. In reconstructing actual
fire spread from photographs and observations, it appears that
the fire traveled the last 1,800 feet to the ridgeline in about
15 minutes or well within the range of modeled conditions.
In terms, of fireline intensity, 100 B.t.u. /sec. /ft. of fireline
is about at the upper limit for control by hand crews and
500-700 B.t.u. /sec. /ft. for direct controlof a fire by
any forces. Fireline intensities for cases 1, 2, and 3 were
5,500, 6,000, and 12,000 B.t.u. /sec. /ft. .respectively, or
absolutely uncontrollable . • ■■ ■ r
Fire Behavior Summary Steep chutes, 10-20 m.p.h. upslope
winds, and dense, flammable Gambel's oak all combined to place
those in the saddle above in an extremely vulnerable position.
The topography below the saddle, as mentioned earlier, probably
denied the crew members good visibility of what was going on
below them; Visibility also was impaired by dense smoke from
the main fire and the squads burnout fires.
A prophetic report prepared by the Colorado State Forest
Service^ described a "fuel type X" that supports high-to-
severe wildfire hazards. These primarily oakbrush fuels "are
dense, high brush 1-1/2 to 10 feet in height. Small scattered
3/ Guidelines and Criteria for Wildfire Hazard Areas,
September 1974, Colorado State Forest Service, Fort Collins,
Colorado .
- 48 -
patches of conifer or deciduous trees or scattered individual
trpes way also exist but are of minor effect and occurrence.
The fuels are continuous or nearly so. Respite heavy shading,
the ground is seldom damp. Flammability may vary markedly in
the year due to changes in fuel moisture and leaf fall. Fire
seldom kills these species. Many re-sprout after fires with
more stems resulting in more numerous, thin-stemmed fuels
than before."
Burning characteristics are described as becoming "extra
hazardous during special tiroes of the year. The critical time
of year varies with the species. For example, oakbrush is very
difficult to burn when the leaves are green, but W htn itA
le-avet axe, btom and Atilt hanging on the. bn.anc.hej>, it become*
one. oh Colomdo 'a moAt hlamablt j$ue£a for 2 to 3 weeks in
autumn." The key point here is that these highly flammable
autumn conditions in oakbrush existed in the Battlement Creek
drainage in mid- July due to the June 14 frost!
The report clearly described many of the events observed
in the Battlement Creek fire:
"The "X" fuels support medium to high intensity
fires, short-range spot fires are common, rate of spread
is moderate to fast, flare=Hips brief but common and hot,
just-burned area is tenable by humans within about 1/4
hour, the fire front is impassable. Brush fires seldom
burn throughout the night and into the next day if
suppression action is made.
These areas are of state interest due to the associated
burning characteristics, the difficulty of fire suppression
and the resultant dangers to life and property during
- 49 -
special times. By their very nature "x" fuels often create
a false sense of security due to their lush greenness and
sometimes non-flammable periods. Many people find it
impossible to believe the potential flammability until
they witness burning in critical periods. Its (oakbrush)
rate of fire spread has been observed and timed to be an
incredible 16 acres per minute, steady for 3 hours, in
Colorado! Fast running mule deer have been found dead
in oakbrush burns — unable to outrun the fire’s spread.
Brush fires are very sensitive to wind direction.
Property and lives considered safe on a flank can be
quickly threatened within minutes by a wind shift."
Under the July conditions of frost-induced dieback in Gambel's
oak in Battlement Creek, the oakbrush stands must be considered
as a most potent fuel type.
III. SUPPRESSION EFFORT AND ACCIDENT SEQUENCE
A. Accident Sequence
In order to set the stage for full understanding of the
events relating to the three burn fatalities and one serious
burn injury of the afternoon of Saturday, July 17, 1976, it
would be helpful to include the highlights of the previous day,
Friday, July 16.
Stragety and Tactics— Day Shift, Friday, July 16 - The general
plan for the day shift was to hold the fire to the east of the
Battlement Creek road, and to stop the upcanyon southerly
spread from reaching gas wells, pipelines, and the critical
Project Rulison site, with its potential for gas explsions,
radioactivity exposure, etc. To do this, the fire boss planned
ground tankers and hand crews along the Battlement Creek road
and generally northerly along the west flank toward the point
- 50 -
of origin (figs. 3a, 3b). Air tankers were used to retard
spread along this flank. One of these air tankers, B-26 No.
56, flown by Don Goodman of MisSoula, Montana, crashed and burned
about 0856 m.d.t. Friday, July 16, killing pilot Goodman.
Details of this accident are covered in a separate report.
The line boss and Sawtooth interregional crew were involved
much of the day on this crash and the resulting fire.
After early morning size-up by the fire boss and line boss,
a bulldozer ordered earlier was assigned to build fireline
generally along a spur ridgetop easterly from a cattleguard
at point 7165 on the Battlement Creek road, near the center of
Sec. 23 (fig. 3a). This line construction began about 0900
and was completed about 1600. The fire at this time (1600) was
exhibiting vigorous behavior, including two impressive fire
whirls, in the next draw about 1/2 mile north, near the section
line 14/23. ' ■
The Coconino NF Mormon Lake and Happy ' Jack hotshot crews
had arrived on the fire about 0630 Friday, and by early afternoon
were in place ready to begin a major burnout of the newly
constructed catline, starting at the base of rocky bluffs to
the east, and burning westerly downhill along the catline
toward the Battlement Creek road. Firing began at the top
(Point A, fig. 20) about 1615 ; and reached the road at the bottom
(Point C, fig. 20) about 2030 as darkness approached. This firing
- 51 -
Hand Line Bui
- ACCIDENT SI
v > 0
oweri
Burnout
Started
IREACI
Figure 20.
- 52 -
was generally successful — a strip of 60 feet or more along the
catline was burned, with a few locations exceeding 100 feet.
No spotting occurred outside the line. This fire continued to
creep downhill most of Friday night, burning mostly ground
fuels. Some unburned patches of fuel remained between the catline
and the draw just to the north.
Strategy and Tactics, Night Shift, Friday, July 16 - The night
shift continued burning out from the bottom of this catline
northerly along the east side of the Battlement Creek road
(C-N and beyond along road, fig. 20) and by Saturday morning
had tied into the burn of Friday afternoon near section line
14/23. This burnout by the night shift was spotty and had
considerable unburned fuel remaining Saturday morning.
Also during the Friday night shift, other hand crews built
handline along a ridgetop from near point 8850 in Sec. 24
(Point E, fig. 20) . The intent here was to construct and burn
out this ridgetop fireline Friday night. The line construction
was completed, but burning out was not attempted because the
crew had no fusees. Even if fusees had been available, night
shift burning at this location would have been difficult
and less than fully effective.
The Mormon Lake and Happy Jack crews were bedded down about
0100 for the night in fire camp and got 5-6 hours rest under
fire camp conditions.
- 53 -
Strategy and Tactics, Day Shift, Saturday, July 17 - Following
debriefing of night shift overhead and a morning look at the fire
by the fire boss and the line boss, the strategy for Saturday
day shift was to hold the south flank catline and the west flank
Battlement Greek road. The handline (about 40 chains long)
built along the ridge in the southeast corner during the night
from E to G (fig. 21) was to be widened and burned out, thus
tying in the entire perimeter. The critical spot on the fire,
in terms of potential fire behavior as shown on Friday afternoon,
was the ridge top from E to G. The Mormon Lake crew was assigned
to this portion of the fire. This crew was specifically chosen
for this tough assignment by the fire boss, based on the crew's
demonstrated capability on the Friday afternoon catline burning
out assignment.
The Happy Jack crew was assigned to the burned out south
catline and Battlement Creek road (A-D, fig. 21) with
instructions to burn out inside Friday's black line and also
begin mopup along the outer edge of the burn.
Other crews were on other portions of the fireline, which
by now were in mopup stage.
After a general briefing of overhead by the fire boss in fire
camp, at about 0700, the Happy Jack and Mormon Lake crews moved
out of fire camp for the day shift. The Happy Jack crew hiked
up the catline to the east and began firing about 0900 to expand
- 54 -
**O0S+ ■ V-^C- .
T ; ■* r ,
.ont E toward P llfs 1 /; ?
ihe Improvennfenf jarred 1100
w lout Started 13ij6
Started
0900
^•n***^, -^rtcr, .■-« v>X
S'WtiA f I ^
o /r?> flHr J Sr -
LjjSSEr* mict’
• ^s]
■V: -
j2#a»
Figure 21.
-55-
Friday’s burnout. This burnout continued downhill toward the
Battlement Creek road, reaching the road about 1200 (A-B-C s
fig. 21). While this was going on, air tankers were laying
a retardant line generally from the upper end of the catline,
along the base of the rock bluffs, and along the ridgetop toward
the cold burn of Friday (A-E-F-G, fig. 21). Air tanker
activity continued from 0930 to 1200. The intent of this retar-
dant line was to reinforce the ridgetop handlihe that would be
burned out later in the day.
The Mormon hake crew arrived at the base: heliport along
the Battlement Creek' road about 0730 and waited until 1030
while the Bell 212 helicopter assigned to the fire was occupied
in making three trips to shuttle a crew from Grand Junction to
the fire base heliport. When this helicopter became available,
about 1030, the line boss, sector boss. Mormon Lake crew boss
and a few crewmen made their fire reconnaissance flight over
their assigned area (E-G, fig. 21). While airborne, the line
boss gave the sector boss and crew boss a thorough briefing as
to their handline improvement-burnout assignment, including
their planned escape route into the now cold burn of Friday
afternoon. The helicopter ferry of. the remainder of the Mormon
Lake crew was completed soon thereafter, and the entire Mormon
Lake crew was at the base of the rock bluff (Point E, fig. 21)
about 1100. Improvement of the handline began toward the heli-
spots down the ridgeline (from E toward F, fig. 21) . One squad
boss with 14 crewmen was assigned to this activity.
- 56 -
The Mormon Lake crew boss had two radios for the day shift —
a Coconino NF set allowing him to talk to each of his two squad
bosses, each of whom also had only a Coconino radio; and a BLM
fire net radio which allowed him to talk to the sector boss,
line boss, fire camp, etc. This radio setup allowed the crew
boss to communicate both up and down organizationally, but did
require two separate radios to do so. Best evidence indicates
that all radios functioned normally throughout the day.
The sector boss started the crew boss and one crewman burning
out narrow fingers of fuel running up into the rock bluff.
Another crewman was stationed on top of the rock bluffs to
watch for spots. As this was going on, the bulk of the crew
was improving the handline down the ridgetop.
At about this same time, the Happy Jack crew reached the
bottom of the catline (Point C, fig. 21). While one squad
ate lunch, the other squad continued burning out in the bottom
of the draw (OD, fig. 21), reaching 500 feet or more inside
the fire edge. The Friday evening burnout of the lower catline
and road had generally resulted in a ground fire, with scorching,
but not consumption, of the brush canopy. This draw burned readily,
and when firing was completed about 1315, the fire burned
uphill toward the Mormon Lake crew. The Happy Jack crew went
on to another part of the fire. Apparently, neither crew knew
of the specific location or assignment of the other.
- 57 -
When the Mormon Lake line improvement squad had worked about
half way down the ridge to the upper helispot (about midway
between E and F, fig. 21), the sector boss moved the Mormon
Lake burnout squad to the base of the rock bluff to burn out a
60- to 80-foot-wide strip on the west or fire side of the
improved line. The burnout squad consisted of the crew boss,
one squad boss, and three crewmen. The time was now about
1330.
This burnout progressed slowly, with difficult ignition of
the sparse fuels. The crew boss sent one crewman out to the
fireline. This crewman later joined the other crewman on top
of the rock bluff, leaving the crew boss, squad boss, and two
crewmen as the burnout squad. The burnout reached a dense stand
of Gambel's oakbrush about one-third of the way from the rock
bluff to the upper helispot. The time was now about 1400.
This dense brush burned vigorously, and coupled with the noticeable
increase in smoke from the draw below the burnout operation,
inspired the sector boss (who was located on a rocky point
uphill from Point E, fig. 21) to instruct the crew boss to speed
up the line improvement squad on toward the safety zone (Point G,
fig. 21). He also instructed the crew boss to narrow down and
speed up his burnout on down the ridgeline to join the remainder
of the crew in the safety zone when his burnout was done. '
The sector boss also ordered an air tanker load of retardant
to reinforce the fireline. This air tanker was launched at
- 58 -
1410 from Grand Junction airport, with a lead plane for
supervision. The lead plane ordered a second air tanker
en route.
The sector boss advised the crew boss of the impending
arrival of the air tanker and directed the crew boss to move
the line improvement squad downhill to the safety zone to avoid
possible impact hazard from retardant to be dropped by the
air tanker.
Using a crew radio, the crew boss instructed the line
improvement squad boss to move on down the ridge to the safety
zone and warned him of the impending arrival of air tankers .
This squad movement occurred without incident, but the last man
had to hurry to avoid the smoke and flames approaching the ridge-
top just south of the lower helispot (Point G, fig. 21). The
squad boss reported to the crew boss when 14 members of the
line improvement squad reached the safety zone. The crew
boss relayed this message to the sector boss. The sector boss
assumed this meant the entire crew was in the safety zone,
not just the line improvement squad. Moments before this
message from the crew boss , the sector boss had observed
four men moving out of the smoke near where the burnout squad
had been and join the line improvement squad. The sector
boss assumed these four men were the burnout squad.
Actually, crew boss Czak, with his three-man burnout
squad (squad boss Gibson, crewmen Furey and Nelson) , was still
uphill on the ridgetop, separated by 100-200 yards from the line
- 59 -
improvement squad in the safety zone. The time was now about
1425-1430. The burnout squad tried to reach, the safety zone
occupied by the, line improvement squad but was unable to do so
due to. the fire front hitting the ridgetop. just, south of the
lower helispqt (Point G, fig. .£1 --see, also figure 17 for photo-
graph of fire at this time). The crew boss then radioed his
line improvement squad boss in the safety, zone that he and the
burnout squad were "trapped" and unable to join them in the safety
zone. This radio conversation was. calm, without any sign of
panic, and the line improvement squad boss interpreted this
only as meaning the burnout squad was temporarily cut off
from the safety zone. .. ; ,;
The crew boss also radioed the sector, boss that he was unable
to get into the planned safety zone and told the sector boss
that he was proceeding back up the ridgetop, fireline toward the
rock bluff. The sector boss was dismayed to Iqarn that the
burnout squad was not already safely with the line improvement
squad, as he had thought earlier. The sector boss told the crew
boss that because of heavy smoke obscuring fhe sector boss’s
visibility , he could not advise him on an escape, route.
The crew boss and his three-man burnout squad then started rapidly
back uphill southerly along the ridgetop toward the rock bluffs
(approximately .from F toward, E, fig. 21). The time was now
1430-1435. The sector boss tried unsuccessfully several times
during the next 20 to 30 minutes to contact the crew boss by
radio .
-60
Fire-Induced winds had now Increased, and as the first air
tanker from Grand Junction arrived about this time, it was
unable to drop along the ridgeline (where the burnout squad was) ,
as requested by the sector boss. Heavy smoke and strong, erratic
winds prevented the drop where requested. A few minutes later,
the air tanker made a drop diagonally across the ridgeline
approximately at the base of the rock bluffs. This had no
effect on the burnout squad.
About 1440,' the burnout squad was unable to proceed any
further uphill along the ridge line toward the rock bluffs.
Their movement was stopped (at Point E, fig. 21) by heavy
smoke and flames, perhaps from their wind-fanned burnout hitting
against the fireline along which the crew had been moving.
Upon orders from the crew boss, they removed their canvas
cruiser vests, moistened the vests and their shirts and trousers
with water from their canteens, and laid face down in the mineral
soil of the fireline. They covered their heads and faces with
the moistened canvas vests. All had aluminum cap-style hard hats
Homex fire-resistant shirts, and non-fire-resistant work trousers
All four men were close enough to touch each other, The flames
and smoke roared overhead. The time was about 1440-1445.
B« Post-Accident Rescue and Hediqal Action
While the fire was overrunning the four burnout squad members
shortly before 1448 m.d.t. July 17, 1976, crewman Nelson stood
up from his prone position on the fireline (their attempted
- 61 -
refuge point), shouted, "I'm on fire," and ran downhill into
the fire area below the burnout squad position. His body was
later found with his burned watch nearby stopped at 1448.
He was badly burned.
Shortly after Nelson left the burnout squad position,
crew boss Czak stood up, shouted unintelligibly, and ran generally
down the ridgeline. His body was later found approximately
1,100 feet away from the burnout squad refuge position. He
was burned, but much le$s so than Nelson-
Crewman Furey and squad boss Gibson remained, apparently in
a prone position in the burnout squad location. Both were
burned as the fire swept over them. Furey' s work trousers and
fire-resistant shirt were burned entirely off his back except
for small fragments. He was in considerable pain. Gibson
advised Furey to remain on the ground, to try to rest, that
help was on the way. Gibson heard a helicopter overhead at
this time.
Sector boss Coleman arrived at the Furey-Gibson location
about 1510. Coleman radioed word of the accident to the fire
boss and quickly checked the immediate area for other burnout
squad members. He found no one else in the immediate area.
Using a Coconino crew radio he found at the scene, Coleman
then summoned Kimball, squad boss of the line-building portion of
the Mormon Lake crew, from their refuge in the burned area below
the helispot. Coleman instructed Kimball to bring his squad
from their refuge in the burned area and to come up the ridgeline
- 62 -
to the Furey^Gibson location to help 'locate the missing men
(Czak and Nelson) • ■ ... r
About this time, Furey stopped breathing, so Coleman began
mouth- to-mouth resuscitation. While this resuscitation effort
was going on, Safety Officer Bellar and Maps and Records Officer
Woody were eh route by helicopter to the helispot just downhill
from Coleman's location. They had first aid equipment with
them. Coleman continued resuscitation efforts on Furey for
about 15 minutes until Bellar and Woody 'arrived. Bellar, a
trained emergency medical- technician, checked Furey' s life
signs, which indicated ho sign of life; Coleman was unable
to detect any signs of life all the time he Was administering
resuscitation to Furey. -The group decided that any further
efforts at resuscitation on Furey were useless, and turned
their efforts to aid Gibson, who was seated nearby. Gibson
was in considerable pain.
Gibson was half-carried, half-walked, downhill to the
helispot and boarded the waiting helicopter. Mormon Lake crewman
Armstrong also boarded the helicopter to assist Gibson. The
helicopter was airborne at 1553 and landed at St : . Mary's Hospital,
Grand Junction, at 16 lO. Gibson was admitted to the emergency
room and received treatment from Dr. G. R. Kempers. Upon
the recommendation of the staff at St. Mary's Hospital, Gibson
was transferred to the Burn/Trauma Unit at Bernalillo County
- 63 -
Medical Center, Albuquerque, New Mexico, the next day, Sunday,
July 18. He is presently (August 4) recovering at that hospital.
His medical prognosis appears favorable.
While Gibson's evacuation was going on, the Mormon Lake
crew and others were searching for the other two missing burn-
out crew members. Nelson's body was located, and shortly
thereafter, Czak's body (fig. 22a, 22b). The fire boss had
earlier requested' both a doctor and emergency medical technician.
Dr. J. L. Sisk of Rifle and EMT Steve Miller of St. Mary's
Hospital, Grand Junction, arrived separately by helicopter
about 1700. Czak, Furey, and Nelson were pronounced dead on
the scene. Garfield County Coroner 0. L. Sowder of Rifle
arrived later by helicopter and aided in the helicopter transport
of the bodies to the Sowder Funeral Home in Rifle.
Because of the lack of facilities at Rifle, no autopsies
were performed. The bodies were shipped by air to mortuaries
in the victims' home towns. (Czak to Flagstaff, Arizona;
Furey to Salmon, Idaho; Nelson to Bloomer, Wisconsin.) A
member of the Mormon Lake crew accompanied the bodies as escorts
to their home towns.
The Garfield County (Colorado) Coroner's Office reports
show asphyxiation as cause of death for Czak, Furey, and
Nelson.
All the burn victims wore fire-resistant shirts (GSA Stock
No. 8415-00-233-5819), which were apparently in good condition
- 64 -
prior to the fire. All wore work trousers which were not fire-
resistant. In addition, all wore Filson canvas cruiser vests
over their fire-resistant shirts. These vests were removed,
moistened by water from canteens, and draped over the men's
heads for facial and respiratory protection. All wore aluminum
cap-style hard hats during this time. All laid face down in
the mineral soil of the fireline which had a shallow (12-18
inches) depression at this point (fig. 23). None had fire
shelters.
Fabric samples of work trousers and fire-resistant shirts
from the dead firefighters have been submitted to FS Missoula
(Montana) Equipment Development Center for further technical
analysis.
IV. INVESTIGATION
Grand Junction BLM District Manager Tom Owen was notified of the
accident at approximately 1520, Saturday, July 17. Colorado BLM
Safety Officer Dick Huff and Grand Junction staffman Gus Juarez
were immediately involved with investigative action and followup
medical matters and care of the bodies.
The following sequence of events covers the time period from
the accident to the initial investigation:
July 17
1600 - (Approx.) Safety Officer Bellar marked location of victims
and collected personal effects.
- 65 -
I
ON
O'
I
Figure 22a. — Scene showing refuge site of burnout squad (Furey
location, foreground) and final location of individual
burn victims by name. Measured slope distance along
fireline from Furey location to Czak location about
1,100 feet.
Burnec * pack Camera , canteen-general pack contents-
probably cruiser vest J* sugar cigarettes Skoal Kleenex First Aid Pk
f. x V
m j Sun Glasses
•$//
q ? Hard hat
Accident Sile-E ^ ^ > Hard h>t
2 singed cruiser vests GIBSON
(intact) containing AFUREY clothing
T T>TDP ^ Kl 4 ~ 1 j r r
1 BIFC radio
1 crew radio
xX burned off.
JjZ hard hats, burned
U liners melted
liners melted
1-4 qt.
\H-
canteen
. canteen
canteen
>/'
oV>
Watch
Burned canvas vast J
X Pocket/
knife
/ Shoe
tf
Oe ij
}
Penny
Remains (eyeletSj^X
of military web ▲+ A .
belt)
^ canteens
NELSON
badly burned
51 Fusees
CZAK
A
0
Wa
JL. x x
Watch
* X Crew radio
Clothes not badly burped,
SKETCH MAP
BATTLEMENT CR. DISASTER
7 - 20-76
A- FATALITY
A- CASUALTY
4 - FUSEES FOUND
X - OBJECTS FOUND
MAP SKETCH BY JON BELLAR
Figure 22b.
67-
Figure 23. — Ridgetop fireline refuge site of burnout squad. X shows
location of Furey's body.
- 68 -
1615 - Huff and Juarez talked to Mormon Lake crew member Armstrong
at St. Mary's Hospital in Grand Junction. Armstrong had
accompanied injured squad boss Gibson. Completed CA-16
at that time.
1730 «•- Huff and Juarez met remainder of Mormon Lake crew at airport,
began taking statements.
2130 - Huff and Juarez took statements from remainder of crew at
airport.
2230 - District personnel Owen, Juarez, Johnson and Byron Kropf
of the BLM Colorado State Office met with fire overhead
Haslem, Coleman, Smith, Bartlett, Kellogg, Putnam and Woody
to review accident and fire plans.
2300 - District Manager Owen ordered a departmental project
overhead team to relieve present team.
2330 - Huff and Juarez interviewed survivor at St. Mary's Hospital,
Gibson was sedated and in pain. A nurse was present
during the 20-minute interview,
0100 — Fire overhead team returned to fire camp.
July 18
Huff collected statements from coroner and doctor. Also coordinated
reports and records requirements with R- 3 fiscal management
and the crew's home unit, the Coconino National Forest.
1630 - Four members of investigation team BIFC arrived at Grand
Junction. The three remaining team members arrived that
night and the next morning.
69 -
1800 - New overhead team relieved team on fire.
1930 - Team members Wilson, Heilman, Mutch, and O'Dell inter-
viewed Mormon Lake squad boss Kimball.
July 19-24
Team members continued field investigation,
July 2 4- August 3
Individual team members continued work on assigned portions of
report .
August 4-6
Team met in Denver, Colorado, complete draft of report.
70
V.
ORGANIZATION AMD MANAGEMENT - Battlement Creek fire
/ i. • .• - ^ Jl t 4 -» 'J.\ r - '■ -i .4 h, :
A. Fire Overhead and Crew Assignments 7/16-7/17/76
7/16 DAY SHIFT
f"
Time Officer
Dillon
0900 *
Fire Boss
Haslem
7/15*
. .. ,'i
Service Chief
Engle
0900 *
— 1 n~-
Line Boss
Smith
P.M. 7/15*
I
Sector I
Putnam
P.M. 7/15*
Grand Jet.
Eff Crew
•iv v; •», ■■
Plans Chief
Bartlett
0715*
•Safety Officer
"■< Be liar • ■
0715*
L Maps & Records
Woody
0715*
1
Sector II
Sexton
P.M. 7/15*
Happy Jack Crew •
Mormon Lake Crew
* Arrival at Grand Junction and assumption of responsibility
7/16 WIGHT SHIFT
Fire Boss
Haslem
i r “ —L 1 — — i
Time Officer Service Chief Line Boss pPlans Chief
Dillon ■ Engle Vincent Bartlett
-Safety Officer
Be liar
'-’•Maps & Records
1
1
!
Woody
Sector I
Sector II
Sector III
Green
Sexton
Mitchell
Carson
Hotshot
SRV Crews
#2/30,39,
Blue Jay SRV
Santa Fe 70
Panam SRV
FIRE ORGANIZATION
7/17/76 Day Shift
*moved to Sector I approximately 1330
after burnout completed.
See figures 24 and 25 following.
B. Overhead Qualification and Experience
District Manager Tom Owen with the advice of Roy Johnson,
Fire Control Officer, initially assigned District employee
Joseph Haslem as fire boss. They also requested two crews
and two sector bosses at that time. Subsequent orders for
specific overhead were determined by fire boss Haslem and
transmitted to BIFC by Grand Junction Dispatch Center.
BIFC coordinators followed the normal procedure of requesting
overhead by position from units adjacent to the fire.’ In
this case, requests were filled by fire control personnel
stationed at BIFC and Wyoming BLM at Lander and Rawlins.
In addition, several local Grand Junction District personnel
were assigned, including Bureau of Land Management and Forest
Service detailers previously assigned at the Grand Junction
Fire Center. A summary of orders placed with BIFC for this
fire on July 15 and 16 follows.
- 75 -
Overhead orders received at BIFC 7/15 and 16, 1976 from Grand
Junction, Battlement Creek fire .
7/15 2340 -
BIFC #760970
7/15 2355 -
BIFC #760971
7/16 0800 -
BIFC #760974
7/16 2005 -
BIFC #760996
1 Safety Officer, Wyoming BLM, J. Bellar
2 Sector Bosses, Wyoming BLM, G. Green and
M Woody
BIFC, T. Sexton, B. Mitchell
4 Heliport Mgr's, R-4> Ek Patterson, D, Hamrick,
Geo. Starr; BIFC, R. Everson
1 Timekeeper, BIFC, Cindy Billion
1 Line Boss, BIFC, R. Vincent
1 Service Chief, BIFC, D. Engle
1 Plans Chief, Wyoming BLM, B. Bartlett
3 Ramp Personnel
2 Helicopter Managers Class 1, R-4
1 Logistics Team, BIFC, B. Carr and J. Reginato
1 Supply Officer, BIFC, M. Mitchell
1 Timekeeper, BIFC, L. Johnson
1 Tool Mgr., BIFC, R,, Weeks
1 Ass ' t. Supply Officer, BIFC, Campbell
1 Ass't. Camp Officer, BIFC, B, Call
1 Air Service Mgr., Helicopter (trainee), BIFC,
B. Carlton
- 76 -
For several years, the BLM and the Forest Service have
used similar but somewhat different qualification criteria for
certifying individuals for specific fire suppression positions.
The differences have been in the amount and currency of
experience and the type of formal training required. In 1974,
the agencies jointly developed a common qualification system
which combined the strong aspects of both systems. The new
system is currently in the process of being adopted and is used
by all Forest Service units. The BLM has begun to implement
the system through designation of two states and the Boise
Interagency Fire Center as test units.
Consequently, personnel on the Battlement Creek fire were
rated on two systems: the old BLM system and the new Inter-
agency Fire Qualification System. Requirements in the new system
are considerably more demanding in terms of training and
experience, and in addition, require a high level of physical
fitness based on aerobic (oxygen) capacity.
The following table contains the fire assignment and the
qualification rating according to the system by which the
individuals were rated for key overhead assignment to the
Battlement fire on July 16 and 17.
An individual summary of key overhead showing work experience
and training relevant to the position in. which they were
assigned on the Battlement Creek fire follows:
- 77 -
Name
Regular
Duty Station
On
Joseph Haslem
Grand Junction BLM
Colorado
7/15
Walt Smith
Aerial Fire Depot, FS
Missoula, Montana
7/16
William Bartlett
Rawlins District, BLM
Wyoming
7/16
Dave Engle
BIFC-BLM
7/16
Monford Woody
Rawlins District, BLM
Wyoming
7/16
Jon Bellar
Rawlins District, BLM
Wyoming
7/16
Jim Sexton
BIFC - BLM
7/16
Leonard Coleman
Grand Junction BLM
Colorado
7/16
Ted Putnam
Aerial Fire Depot, FS
Missoula, Montana
7/16
Don Kellogg
Grand Junction BLM
Colorado
7/16
Rick Vincent
BIFC-BLM
7/16
Cindy Dillon
BIFC-BLM
7/16
Steve Cornell
BIFC-BLM
7/16
Bill Mitchell
BIFC-BLM
7/16
Gale Green
Rawlins District, BLM
Wyoming
7/16
Fire Qualification
Card Rating
Battlement Fire
Assignment
7/15-7/18
Fire Boss
Fire Boss I
Line Boss (day)
Division Boss
Plans Chief
Plans Chief II
Service Chief
Maps and Records
Service Chief :
Plans Chief II
Safety Officer
Safety Officer
Sector Boss
Sector Boss
Sector Boss
Sector Boss
Sector Boss
Crew Boss
Scout
Line Boss (night)
Finance Chief
Time Officer
Crew Liaison Off-
Sector Boss
Sector Boss
Line Boss II
Time Officer
Crew Boss
Division Boss
Sector Boss
(all except Smith and
Putnam rated on BLM
system)
Jack Haslem, Fire Boss I (rated by BLM system)
Experience: Fire Boss 1-3 fires since 1974
Recent Training: Fire Command 1975
Fire Generalship 1976
Walt Smith, Division Boss (rated by Interagency Fire
Qualifications System)
Experience: Division Boss - 1 fire
Sector Boss - 3 fires
Work History: Smokejumper and crewman - many fires
Recent Training: Sector Boss
Intermediate Fire Behavior
William Bartlett, Plans Chief II, rated by BLM System
Experience: Worked in plans function in 197}..
Work History: Varied experience as crew boss on
small fires in past three years.
Recent training: Plans and Service functional training
in 1974.
Dave Engle, Service Chief II (rated by BLM System (only
person in Service Section on July 17)
Experience: Served as service chief on one fire
in 1975. Also limited experience in
other service functions, especially
. heliport and air service areas.
Work History: Numerous crewman and crewboss fires.
Recent Training: Fire organization and Management
Training in 1975.
Cindy Dillon, Time Officer (rated by BLM System (only
person in finance section))
Experience: Timekeeper on 7 fires.
Work History: Limited additional fire experience
Recent Training: Finance Training 1976.
- 79 -
Leonard Coleman, Sector Boss (rated by BLM system)
Experience: Two fires in sector boss position.
Work History: Numerous small fires as crewman and
crew boss.
Recent Training: BLM Fire Academy.
Ted Putnam, Crew Boss (rated by Interagency Fire
Qualification System)
Experience: First fire in Sector Boss capacity.
Numerous fires as crewman and
smoke j umper .
Recent Training: Sector Boss Training 1975.
Don Kellogg: Served as scout or observer for fire boss.
Not rated by qualification system.
Experience: None on fire team.
Training: None.
C. Crew Qualification and Experience
Crews assigned to the Battlement Creek fire were organized Forest
Service interregional or hotshot crews, Snake River Valley
organized Mexican-American crews, and a newly formed emergency
crew from Grand Junction. With the exception of the Grand
Junction crew, all crews were well-trained and experienced.
Most had been assigned to several fires in similar conditions
this year. This was the seventeenth fire of the first season of
the newly formed Mormon Lake crew, of which five had been large
brush or timber fires .
The Mormon Lake crew boss, squad bosses and crewmen all had
completed training requirements for their positions and had been
actively involved in refresher training sessions.
A summary of the experience and training of this crew follows
- 80 -
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY - MORMON LAKE HOTSHOT CREW
CZAK - Crew Boss (deceased)
5 / 73 - 8/73
5 / 74 - 8/74
4 / 75 - 11/75
3 / 76 - 7/76
Training
Hotshot Crew, Flagstaff RD, Coconino NF
Hotshot Crew, Bine Ridge RD, Coconino NF
Hotshot Crew, Blue Ridge RD, Coconino NF
Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino NF
S-100, 110, 130
230, 230, 270
Squad Boss
Squad Boss -
Crew Boss
Crew Boss
Total Time 17 Months
FUEEY - Crewman (deceased)
6 / 73 - 8/73
6 / 74 - 8/74
5 / 75 - 8/75
4 / 76 - 7/76
Training
Salmon National Forest
Salmon National Forest
Salmon NF
Mormon Lake RD, Coconino NF
s-ioo, no, 130, 190
Total Time
Pumper Crewman
Pumper Crewman
Helitack Crew.
Hotshot Crewman
10 Months
NELSON - Crewman
5 / 76 - 7/76
Training
(deceased)
Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino Crewman
S-100, 110, 130, 190
Total Time 2 Months
GIBSON - Squad Boss (hospitalized)
5 / 75 - 12/75
4 / 76 - 7/76
Training
Hotshot Crew, Blue Ridge RD, Coconino
Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino
S-100, 110, 130, 190
Total Time 10 Months
KIMBALL - Squad Boss
9 / 70 - 12/70
6 / 71 - 12/71
3 / 72 - 8/72
5 / 75 - 10/75
4 / 76 - 7/76
Training
San Bernardino NF Various Dist. Supp. Crews
San Bernardino NF " " " "
San Bernardino NF " 11 " T '
Hotshot Crew, Blue Ridge RD, Coconino NF
Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino NF
S-100, 110, 130, 190
Total Time 2 2 Months
- 81 -
MORMON LAKE HOTSHOT CREW
May 30, 1976 - Coconino NF, Arizona
(Front Row, Left to Right) - John Gibson (squad boss). Rich Mahrt, Ronald Pavatea, Tony Czak (crew boss),
Bud Caylor (DFMO) , Scott Nelson, Richard Graham
(Center Row, Left to Right) - Carl Armstrong, Tony Strayhand, Steve Furey, Tom Kwiatkowski
(Back Row, Left to Right) - Quane Wofford (with hat), John Simpson, John Meyers, Pat Booth,
Don Kimball (squad boss)
MAHRT - . Crewman
5/75-7/75
8/75-12/75
4/76-7/76
Training
Coronado NF Fire Prevention Tech.
Los Padres NF District Supp. Crew
Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino
S-100, 110, 130, 190
Total Time 10 Months
CASCIANA - Crewman
4/74-11/74
4/75-11/75
4/76-7/76
Training
Hotshot Crew, Blue Ridge RD, Coconino
Tanker Crewman, Blue Ridge, Coconino
Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino
S-100, 110, 130, 190
Total Time 16 Months
ARMSTRONG - Crewman
7/74-7/74
3/75-11/75
4/76-7/76
Training
Quemado RD, Gila NF Mlsc. Project Work, Some Fire
Quemado RD, Gila NF Tanker Crewman
Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino
S-100, 110, 130, 190
Total Time 13 Months
PAY ATE A, R. - Crewman
4/72-7/72
4/73-5/73
7/73-12/73
5/75-6/75
4/76-7/76
Training
Alpine RD, Apache NF Helitack Crew
Alpine RD, Apache NF « "
Hotshot Crew, Flagstaff RD, Coconino
Truckee RD, Tahoe NF Project & Fire
Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino
S-100, no, 130, 190
Total Time 13 Months
PAVATEA, E. - Crewman
5/75-9/75 Truckee RD, Tahoe NF Project & Fire
4/76-7/76 Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino
Training S-100, 110, 130, 190
Total Time 7 Months
- 82 -
WOFFORD - Crewman
4/72-10/72 Hamilton RD, Bitterroot. NF, Montana Project & fire
4/73-10/73 Darby RD, Bitterroot NF, Montana Suppression crew
5/75-11/75 Hotshot Crew, Blue Ridge RD, Coconino
4/76-7/76 Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino
Training S-100, 110, 130, 190
Total Time 21 Months
KWIATKOWSKI Crewman First Season Maximum 3 months
SIMPSON " " "
BOOTH " " "
STRAYHAND " " "
SUTTON " " "
DAVIS " " "
ELY " " "
SULLIVAN " " "
MEYERS " " "
Training S-100, 110, 190
- 83 -
D. Logistical Support
Logistical support for the Battlement Creek Fire was provided
by the Grand Junction fire center at Walker Field. They in turn
would draw on BIFC for requests beyond local capability. In addition,
on July 16 a special logistical support office was established in
Grand Junction to handle direct orders from the fire.
There were no manpower or materiel shortages during the time
of the fire. All confirmed requests were filled. A problem did
occur in ordering procedures and followup in fire camp. While this
did affect some materiel orders, it did not appear to be a major
problem.
E. Fire Planning and Intelligence
There was no functioning system of planning and intelligence
gathering on this fire. One individual served as an observer or
scout for the fire boss. The plans section operated with a plans
chief and one individual initially assigned as maps and records
officer, but due to other demands by the fire boss, served in this
role part-time.
The procedure for transmitting information consisted of fire
boss briefings to line personnel before going on shift. This was
always verbal with no written instructions or maps provided.
Personnel briefed varied, but always included the line boss, and
usually the sector bosses. Written plans were prepared after
the briefing as a record.
- 84 -
There was no system of information exchange between line
personnel working different shifts. Transfer of information
was accomplished verbally by the fire boss.
Helicopters were used by the line boss, sector boss and
crew boss for aerial reconnaissance prior to going on shift.
Such a flight was taken by Smith, Coleman, and Czak on July 17.
There were no helicopter reconnaissance flights made later during
the day, until the rescue activities commenced.
F . Aviation Management Activity
There were no aircraft shortages during the fire. On the
afternoon of July 15, aerial tanker (T59) , a B-26, was available
at Walker Field at Grand Junction. This aircraft, and a Bell
206-B Jet Ranger helicopter. No. 654 W, were the initial attack
complement for the Grand Junction District. Because of the serious
nature of this fire season, a Bell 212 helicopter was also at
Walker Field. There were other retardant aircraft and light
helicopters within a 2-hour radius.
At approximately 1615 on July 15, the Bell 212 helicopter
was grounded for failure of a vital instrument, and replaced
by a Bell 205 helicopter from Boise at 2200. An additional
C-119 air tanker from Winslow, Arizona (Tanker 138) arrived at
approximately 1914. Air tanker No. 56, a B-26, from Denver,
also arrived July 15.
There were several other smaller ongoing fires beside the
Battlement Creek fire No. 1173 where aircraft were being used.
- 85 -
By 1000 on July 16, the Bell 212 helicopter was back on
the line. According to the Grand Junction Fire Center, the
following aircraft were available and being used on the
Battlement Creek fire:
Helicopter 212 81FC
Helicopter 205 440AS
Helicopter 206B 654W*
Baron Lead Plane 98W
Tanker, B-26 T-59*
Tanker, B-26 T-56 (crashed 7/16)
Tanker, C-119 T-138
Light Twins ?
^primary initial attack ships used on the Battlement
Creek fire.
On July 16, most of these aircraft used either their
allowed flight times or duty hours, resulting in a shortage
of pilot hours prior to 0800 on July 17.
There was some confusion between the Battlement Creek fire
boss and the local organization as to availability of the Bell
206B helicopter for the fire. The Grand Junction Fire Center
view was that the ship was assigned to Fire No. 1173 and
available for call. The fire boss view was that this was the
District initial attack ship, and was to be used sparingly.
On the day of the incident — July 17 — major aircraft use
on the Battlement Creek fire was as follows:
- 86 -
Helicopter 212
Helicopter 205
Jet Ranger 206 b
0858 to LUO
0800 to 0830
1015 to 1138
Ferrying San Luis Crews
Took air accident in-
Attached to Fire
(27 men) - G. Jet to
vestigating team to
No. 1172.
Fire Helispot #1.
air tanker crash site.
1300 to 1320
0845
1153 to 1445
Grand Junction - Grand
Refuelled at river. '
Picked up litters
Valley. Loaded LA* tank
and flew to Heli.
and dropped water on
0915 to 0945
#2 on Battlement
spots on NW corner of
Or. Fire.
fire .
Flew overhead crew
over fire for recon-
16 Q 2 to 1921
1430 to 151$
naissance.
Evacuation and fi:
Was over Fire #1173
until ordered to Camp
1000 to 1100
#1173 operation.
Helispot to pick up
Hauled Mormon Lake Crew
Safety Officer and
to Helispot #2 and fer-
Emergency Supplies
ried Blue Jay Crew to
and go to Heli. #2
on top.
1515 to 1918
base heliport .
1200 to 1230
Returned to G. Jet.
Working on rescue and
fire operation.
for initial attack.
2 m
Dispatched to Fire
#1173 - no sign of
emergency mission)
1515 to 1922
Rescue, evacuation on
Fire $1173*
* Special helicopter tank developed by Los Angeles County for dropping
liquids .
- 87 -
Aircraft communication over the fire was on FAA frequency r
122.9 MHZ. There was no overall air management officer, but lead
plane 98W directed air tanker operations. Coordination was
accomplished through constant monitoring of 122.9 MHZ and USFS
air net in the lead plane, air tankers, and large helicopters.
The line boss also carried the air net. Aircraft were ordered
through the Grand Junction Dispatch Office, although it has not
been possible to establish firmly who determined priorities.
Responsibility for fire heliport management was assigned to
Mike Campbell at 0600 on July 17 . He immediately moved the base
heliport to a new location 2 miles north of the fire camp.
Aircraft facility management at Grand Junction functioned
satisfactorily under crowded conditions. The area was quite
congested, especially when large transport aircraft arrived.
The ramp operation was tightly controlled, and security was
present. The retardant plant was operated by Jim McKay of USFS.
In brief recapitulation, there was minimal overall aircraft
coordination or management during this multiple fire complex.
Even though ample aircraft were readily available, they were not
used for reconnaissance or intelligence gathering on this fire
the day of the accident, except for one flight approximately
4 hours before the accident. There was no tight and understood
aircraft use scheduling. Aircraft communications, though
successful, were minimal, and priority setting for aircraft use
was not definite.
- 88 -
VI. FINDINGS
A. Mechanical Factors
There were no mechanical failures that contributed to
the accident.
On-fire radio communication equipment was adequate.
Adequate air support and line workers were available.
The Mormon Lake Crew was wearing the latest Nomex fire
resistant shirts.
Fire shelters were not used. They were not requested
or supplied to the fire.
Fire shelters might have prevented the fatalities at the
refuge site. Additional data to confirm this has been
requested from Missoula Equipment Development Center.
Policy on issuing and carrying shelters has npt been
established for the BLM in Colorado.
B. Physical Fa ctors
Fire behavior was not unusual and was reasonably predictable.
Fire was dominating the local winds at time of accident, not
vice versa .
Fuel condition was unusual for this area because of a late
spring freeze.
The Mormon Lake burnout squad and line building squad could
not see fire buildup below them in the draw.
The fire buildup was observed by many people on the fire
including the fire boss, line boss, adjacent sector boss,
scout and aircraft crews. Its potential rate of spread was
underestimated by them.
Topography did not prevent crew movement.
A steep draw on a southwest exposure and readily available
fuels provided the conditions for rapid upslope fire movement.
- 89 -
C . Human Factors
Grew
The Mormon Lake crew was in good condition, well-disciplined,
and morale was high. They were observed to be a highly
productive crew the day before.
Crew was specifically selected by fire boss for this
assignment because of apparent expertise and previous day’s
performance .
Crew boss and squad bosses were serving in those positions
for the first year, but had worked together on 17 fires this
year.
The crew boss, with the sector boss and line boss, had taken
an aerial reconnaissance flight prior to beginning burnout.
During burnout, crew boss and squad boss were serving as working
members of the four-man burnout squad. No lookout was posted
by the squad.
The line-building portion of the crew was ordered to evacuate
by the crew boss. He asked for and received confirmation that
they had reached the preplanned safety area.
Burnout squad did try to go to the same preplanned safety area
but the fire had crossed their planned route.
Burnout squad then attempted to reach their preselected safety
area, but were blocked by the fire.
Better alternate escape routes over the ridge away from the
fire were available.
Burnout squad remained together, communicated their situation
to the sector boss, and took survival precautions at direction
of crew boss with no evidence of panic.
The four-man burnout squad remained together when overrun by
the fire.
Sometime during or immediately after the fire passed over them,
two men of the burnout squad left their refuge site and
ultimately perished.
The remaining two men of the burnout squad stayed in place.
The survivor stated that he remained prone while the fire
passed over.
■ 90 -
Overhead
New interagency fire suppression qualification standards have
been established recently.
The new standards have been adopted nationally by the Forest
Service and are being pilot tested by the BLM in Montana and
New Mexico.
Standards applicable to this fire were the existing USDI
standards, dated April 23, 1973.
Some members of the fire management team did not meet existing
USDI standards .
Had the new interagency standards been applicable some team
members would not have been qualified for the jobs to which
they were assigned.
The following positions were not filled on this fire:
Tractor boss, fire behavior officer, equipment officer,
communication officer, air attack boss, and others.
Sector boss and line boss relied heavily on Mormon Lake and
Happy Jack crew boss judgment to complete the crews’
assignments.
The fire boss issued a strong and direct order to get out of
the area just prior to the fire's uphill run to an individual
in an adjacent area. This order was interpreted by the adjacent
sector boss who was observing the situation as being directed
to the Mormon Lake crew’s sector boss. Because of this he did
not issue a warning to evacuate that he was about to give to the
Mormon Lake crew’s sector boss.
The crew boss was given specific instructions by the sector boss
to move the line-building squad to the safety area.
The sector boss observed what he thought was the burnout squad
moving out to the heliport, adjacent to the safety area. He
issued no specific instructions to move the burnout squad to
safety.
D. Management Factors
Fire team had not worked together previously and were not a
p're-organlzed project fire team.
- 91 -
The interagency nature of the fire management team was
not a problem.
The plans and service organization was assembled at fire
camp approximately 24 hours prior to the accident.
There was an absence of key support positions in the plans and
service function which resulted in members of team doing other
duties which detracted from their primary assignment.
A central point of ordering and followup at the fire was
not established.
Work assignments and instructions were verbally communicated
to crew boss by fire boss, line boss, and sector boss.
Maps and written instructions were not used in briefings
or distributed.
Mormon Lake crew did not get to line until approximately
1030 due to planned helicopter not arriving when anticipated.
Weather intelligence was not formally and regularly gathered
on the fire. Spot forecasts were not made until Sunday.
Previous day’s fire behavior should have alerted the fire
organization as to the probable fire behavior and served as
a background and clue to alternative escape routes, suppression
action, etc.
There was no aerial reconnaissance by the fire team between
1100 and 1500, July 17, 1976.
There was no intelligence requested nor given from aircraft over
the fire, although aircraft were present most of the time.
The July 17 burnout operations of Happy Jack and Mormon Lake
crews were not tightly coordinated and controlled in the plans
for the day or during execution by the line boss and fire boss.
Burnout at bottom of draw moved slowly at first but accelerated
up the steep slope and cut off the Mormon Lake squad and then
overran them.
Various overhead were aware of the position of the burnout
squad's activity, but the individual crews were not aware of
each others position or activity.
No formal lookout with communications was posted for the
burnout squad.
- 92 -
Rescue effort was prompt and professional and effective.
This accident was not caused hy any single factor, rather
by several contributing factors. There is no evidence of
individual misconduct.
- 93 -
APPENDIX
Memorandum
COPY
To: BLM D-BIFC July 28, 1976
From: Director
Subject: Investigation and Report of Battlement Creek Fire
Fatalities and Injuries
You are hereby designated as the Bureau’s representative and
co-chairman of a factfinding team charged with determining the
conditions and circumstances that led to the recent fatalities
and injuries on the Battlement Creek Fire near Grand Valley,
Colorado. Concurrently with your assignment, Mr. R. Max Peterson,
U.S. Forest Service, is being designated as the other co-chairman.
Once the factfinding team has completed its study and appraisal,
both co-chairmen are to forward duplicate detailed reports of
findings and recommendations to their respective headquarters
offices (Director, BLM, and Chief, U.S. Forest Service) by
August 10, 1975. Since release of these reports will be made
solely and jointly by the headquarters offices, no other releases
of your report are authorized at this time.
1st George L. Turcott
GEORGE L. TURCOTT
Associate Director
cc:
Director, Fire Management, USFS
State Director, Colorado
- 94 -
United states Department of agriculture
FOREST SERVICE
REPLY TO:
SUBJECT;
TO:
WO
COPY
6730 Accident Investigation July 30, 1976
Investigation and Report of Battlement
Creek Fire Fatalities and Injuries
R, Max Peterson
Deputy Chief
You are hereby designated as the Agency's representative
and co-chairman of a factfinding team charged with deter-
mining the conditions and circumstances that led to the
recent fatalities and injuries on the Battlement Creek
Fire near Grand Valley, Colorado. Concurrently with your
assignment, Mr. Jack Wilson, Bureau of Land Management,
is being designated as the other co-chairman.
Once the factfinding team has completed its study and
appraisal, both co-chairmen are to forward duplicate detailed
reports of findings and recommendations to their respective
headquarters offices (Chief, Forest Service, and Director, BLM)
by August 10, 1976. Since release of these reports will be made
solely and jointly by tho headquarters offices, no other releases
of your report are authorised at this time.
/ s/ John R. McGuire
John r. McGuire
Chief
cc;
Director, Fire Management
Director, BLM
PLANS FOR BATTLEMENT CREEK FIRE
Friday, July 16, 1976, Night Shift
Saturday, July 17, 1976, Day Shift
Has lean — F.B.
Bartlett — D.C. Maps and Records:
Engle, Dave — S.C.
BATTELEMENT CREEK FIRE
Fire #1173
Friday - July 16, 1976
(Road)
(Cat Line)
(Bob Clark)
These crews will leave fire camp at 1900 hrs. and will be bussed
to the bottom of Dlv. X. Tools will consist of h shovels and h
pulaskis. In addition each crew will be equipped with 1 chain
saw and 1 radio per crew.
Division B .
Sector #1
Evening Shift :
Line Boss— —Rick Vincent
Division A .
Sector #1 2 Sector Bosses
Sector Boss Green
Carson Hotshots
Santa Fe Hotshots
Pan Ams
Sector Boss Sexton
S R V #70
" # 2
" #39
" #30
- 96 -
This crew will leave camp at 1900 and be transported to the T. V.
antenna site area where they will walk into the area immediately
east of the ridge top. The crew will be equipped with 1 chain saw
and 1 radio.
All overhead will have a radio. Crew members will be reminded of
safety precautions related to working in steep terrain at night,
keep men spaced out, watch for rolling rocks, etc.
BATTLEMENT CREEK FIRE
FIRE # 1173
SATURDAY, JULY 17, 1976
Dayshlf t :
Fire Boss
Line Boss
Plans Chief — -
Service Chief-
Safety Officer
Jack Haslem
Walt Smith
Bill Bartlett
Dave Engle
Jon Be liar
Sector //I
Sector Boss- —Putnam
Sawtooth IR Crew:
Crew will construct handline from road and tie in black on
northwest corner. Bulldozers will be used where possible.
Sector #2
Sector Boss- Sexton
Happy Jack Hotshots and Grand Junction E.F.F.
These crews will mop up along Cat Line and road. Unburned areas
will be burned out upon command.
Sector #3
Sector Boss — Coleman
Mormon Lake Crew
This crew will be helicoptered to the top and will burn out along
line in order to strengthen line. Crew will move into black area
when unburned draw is fired from below.
- 98 -
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
1. REPORT STATUS (check one) (2)
1x1 NEW [3J CORRECT 1 | DELETE
INDIVIDUAL FIRE REPORT
5. Reporting Agency (circle one) (13)
U]blm [2]bia DDnps
6. Area Name (14-17)
88
8. TYPE
a. Fire (28) I b. Protection (29)
2. Calendar
3. Fire No.
4. Reporting
Year (3-1)
(5-8)
Unit
(9-12)
76_
.mi
£00 Z _
7. Fire Name (18-27)
Battlement Creek
m BSF&W [FI OTHER
11. LOCATION OF FIRE ORIGIN (Location plat on reverse of original (38-57)
a. Coordinates (30-38)
Lat. 39.-21, LonglQ-L-ia.
b. Rectangular Survey (39-52)
T. 7S-. R. 95W-, Sec. It, — — Mer.
a. Size (S3)
a. Cause (55-57)
9. CLASS
b. Cost (1) Code (54)
(2) Actual $
10. PLANNING DATA
b. Class of people (58)
12. SUPPRESSION DATA
c. Ownership (59)
e. Topography (61)
8 & 1
g. Rate of spread (63)
i. Fire danger indices
(65-70)
d. Resource value class
f. Hour control zone (62)„
h. Resistance to control (64)
3
j. Fuel model (71-74)
13. BURNED AREA DATA
(9-10) (11-13) (14) (15-17)
(a) (b) (c) (d)
d. First attack
(42-57)
e. Controlled
(58-71)
f. Declared out
(72-75)
(32-37)
(b)
(38-42)
(c)
(59-63)
(g)
Form DI-1201 (February 1973) BLM - DISTRICT OFFICE NPS - AREA BIA - AGENCY BSF&W - REFUGE
-99-
BRIEF OF EVENTS AND PRESS RELEASE PREPARED BY
INVESTIGATION TEAM
PRESS RELEASE
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
Grand Junction, July 21, 1976
The following brief is the first reconstruction of the sequence
of events leading to the death of 3 crew men and 1 injury at the
880-acre Battlement Creek fire. This fire on National Resource
Land under Bureau of Land Management (BLM) jurisdiction was 5
miles west of Grand Valley, Colorado. All 4 men were members
of the Mormon Lake Hotshots Crew assigned to the Coconino National
Forest, Flagstaff, Arizona.
A 7-man team under the co-chairmanship of Jack Wilson, Chief,
Boise Interagency Fire Center, (BLM), and Max Peterson, Deputy
Chief, Forest Service, (FS), has been interviewing personnel who
were in the area prior, during, or following the catastrophe and
have also made an on-site review of the burned area and accident
site .
The team is continuing to reconstruct events during the time of
the tragedy and this is their most accurate assessment of the
facts at this time.
BRIEF
On Saturday, July 17, at about 2:45 p.m., a 4-man burnout crew
from the Mormon Lake Hotshot Crew, Coconino National Forest, (NF) ,
whose planned route of escape was suddenly cut off by flames were
overrun by the fire burning rapidly up a steep draw. Three men died
at the scene, and one was evacuated by helicopter and is in fair
condition in the Albuquerque Burn Center. The dead men were identified
as :
- 100 -
Anthony "Tony" Czak, 25, 643 Campus Heights, Flagstaff,
Arizona,
Scott L. Nelson, 22, 1505 5th Avenue, Bloomer, Wisconsin
Stephen H. Furey, 23, P.0. Box 1127, Salmon, Idaho.
The accident occurred on the Battlement Creek Fire which
started from an undetermined cause 45 miles east of Grand Junction
near Grand Valley, Colorado. The fire started on private lands
and burned on to National Resource Lands managed by the Bureau of
Land Management, (BLM) .
Immediately following the accident, an Interagency Investigation
team was convened and has been on the scene reconstructing the events
which follow:
The Battlement Creek Fire was one of several fires in the area,
and was first attacked with aerial retardant from planes based at
Grand Junction. This was supplemented by Garfield County, BLM, and
Forest Service crews and equipment. When these initial efforts
failed to contain the fire, a fire team was assembled made up of BLM
and USFS personnel. The team was headed by Jack Haslem, Grand
Junction, Colorado, an experienced BLM Fire Boss. Additional crews
and equipment were obtained, totaling approximately 300 men, aerial
tankers, dozers, helicopters, and other equipment. One of the
crews was the specially trained 20-man Mormon Lake Hotshots Crew
from the Coconino NF at Flagstaff, Arizona.
The crew worked on the fire on Friday, July 16, burning out
the critical southeast comer of the fire.
On Saturday, July 17, the crew was transported by helicopter to
a rocky ridge to burn out a handline that had been constructed the
- 101 -
night before. The Crew Boss, Tony Czak, flew the area by
helicopter with the Sector Boss prior to commencing work at
approximately 11 a.m. The Crew Boss assigned fourteen members
of the crew under the supervision of Squad Boss Don Kimball to
widen the handline. He assigned John Gibson, the other Squad
Boss and two crewmen to burn along the handline to provide a barrier to
the main fire. Two members of the crew were stationed above the burnout
crew on the rocky ridge.
The Crew Boss ordered Kimball and his portion of the crew out
of the area and into a previously burned area while he and the
burnout crew remained to complete the remaining distance of about
200 yards. They intended to follow Kimball and the balance of the
crew as the burnout was to be completed in a few minutes.
A fast-moving finger of the fire moved up a steep slope, out
of their view, and cut off their planned route of escape. Czak notified
both his Sector Boss and Squad Boss that he was cut off and unable to
follow the balance of his crew. The four men retreated up the ridge
along the burned out line looking for a safe place. When it became
apparent to them that the fire would overrun them, using survival tech-
niques, they removed their cruiser vests, wet themselves down with water
from their canteens, and laid face down on the ground in a depression
along the fire line.
The heat and smoke was intense as the fire passed over them,
and some of their clothing ignited. Crew Boss Czak and crewmen Nelson
and Furey perished. John Gibson survived. Sector Boss Coleman,
Glenwood Springs, Colorado, arrived approxiamtely ten minutes after
the fire passed and found both Gibson and Furey alive. Steve Furey died
- 102 -
at the scene in spite of first aid, including mouth- to-mouth
resuscitation by Coleman.
Immediately upon arrival at the scene, Coleman advised lire Boss
Haslem that there were injured men and help was needed.
A helicopter with an experienced medical technician and first
aid equipment arrived at the scene within 10 minutes.
John Gibson was promptly removed to St. Mary’s Hospital in Grand
Junction, and later, after initial treatment was flown to the burn
unit in Albuquerque.
The investigation will proceed in two directions:
1. To validate what happened;
2. To determine what factors caused the accident and what
steps the agencies might take to prevent a recurrence
in the future. It will require several more days to
complete the fact-finding phase and write a report.
FOR THE PRESS:
Terms
Fire Boss - Overall direction of the fire fighting activities
Line Boss - Person responsible for all fire line construction
Sector Boss - Responsible to a Line Boss for a portion of the line.
Supervises crew bosses.
Crew Boss - Person in charge of a crew on the fire. (Usually 20
men). Reports to Sector Boss.
Squad Boss - Person in charge of portion of the crew. Reports to
Crew Boss .
- 103 -
Saturday. J«ly 17, 1S7S Tha Daily Santinel, Grand Junction. Colorado
Fire fighters still
battle blaze
By TUPPER HULL
Sentinel staff writer
GRAND VALLEY - Fire fighters for
she U.S. Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) late Friday were banking on a
20-foot wide swath cut aiong a ridge
thick with scrub oak to halt the advance
of a raging brush fire near here which
was burning out of control.
BLM fire boss Jack Haslem said at 7
p.m. Friday an estimated 700 acres of
pinion pine, juniper and oak covered
hills had been consumed by the fire.
Pilot killed
• A veteran pilot for the BLM died in a
fiery plane crash at about 9 a.m. Friday
when the converted B-26 bomber he
owned and was flying' struck a high
mountain- cliff near the fire as the plane
was beginning a sweep into the fire to
dump a load of retardant. The pilot was
identified as Donald Goodman, 58, of
Missoula, Mont.
; The blaze was still raging late Friday
‘night in the Battlement Creek area
.'about five mile? southeast of Grand Val-
ley.
5 As the fire intermittently cooled and
: then burst into explosive hot spots, two
^bulldozers worked through the day cut-
ting the fire line on a ridge about half a
• mile south from the hottest part of the
fire.
t- Full force
j' Fire boss Haslem said he planned to
• throw the full force of his 300 men di-
rectly onto the fire Friday night and
early Saturday morning, taking advan- .
tage of the cooi night weather.
I Earlier in the day Friday, Haslem ,
. said a 10 degree increase in temper-
! ature would threaten spreading the fire
throughout the vast and heavily tim-
bered Battlement Creek valley.
• . As temperatures rose during the day
1 so did the fire's furry but yellow shirted
“hot shot” crews from six western
states were deployed along a narrow
winding road way that separated the
fire from untouched ground.
With their backs to the blaze, the •
, crews watched intently for any sign the
: fire would jump the roadway and .
} spread,
! Haslem said the fire was hotter than
• most brush fires, due mostly to the dry
■>and brittle cak bushes that cover the
1 hillsides here. A frost in mid June, he
' said, killed much of the oak leaving it
^“completely dry." J
Firefighting planes and a helicopter
dropped thousands of gallons of bright
red fire retardants and water on the fire
all day Friday.
Warm temperatures
Forecasts for the Grand Valley area
called for continued warm temper-
atures with the possibility of late after-
noon thunderstorms.
“I wish like hell I’d hear a weath-
erman say there’s going to be six inches
of rain up here tonight,” Haslem said.
Haslem said because the fire was so
capricious he had not placed any of his
men working directly on the fire for
fear they would be trapped in one of the
many valleys in the area should the
blaze suddenly accelerate. “It’s just a
waiting game now,” he said.
The fire is the largest fire in Colorado
this year.
Haslem said the blaze was probably
started by lightning several days ago.
Lightning strikes, he said, will often
smoulder for several days before turn-
ing into actual fires. >
Aeria! view
reveals
destruction
An aerial view of the forest fire at Bat-
tlement Creek, five miles southeast of
Grand Valley, gives dramatic impact to
the destructive force of fire.
From its origin on the north side of
Morissania Mesa, the blaze crested the
peak and swept to the south side ot the
mountain.
The fire has burned a swath from the
base of the mesa to the top at least one-
half mile wide. All that is visibie now on
the north side, of what was once a forest
of juniper and pine is a gray and black
landscape. The gray was brush. The
black, trees.
• There is no immediate threat to any
of the homes in the Grand Valley area.
The blazes Friday afternoon were
raging on the south side, and white
■smoke attempted to crowd scattered
clouds out of the sky.
Above the fire, flying into the smoke
and possible updrafts caused by the tre-
mendous heat generated by the flames,
are helicopters carrying water or
smoke jumpers. They fly into the
smoke, and emerge periodically ap-
pearing to almost touch the tops of the
trees.
V Two miles further south from the
scene of the fire, on a barren bluff is the
charred wreckage of a B-2G bomber
which was dropping fire retardant on
the fire. That crash claimed the iife of
■Don Goodman, a pilot from Missoula,
iMont., at 9 a.m. Friday.
- 104 -
Sot., July 1 7, 1 976, Denver, Colo. ' Rocky Mountain New^-
Flier fighting forest fire killed in
By JONATHAN DEDMON
News Staff
A 58-year-old Montana man was killed Friday
fighting a forest fire on the Western Slope when
his plane crashed while dropping fire retardant
chemicals.
The fire, which had consumed more than 600
acres in the Battlement Creek area east of
Grand Valley, was reported out of control late
Friday and was being battled by more than 250
Fire fighters.
A spokesman for the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) identified the dead man as
Don Goodman of Missoula.
Goodman’s plane, a converted B-26 bomber,
was one of three dropping fire retardant chemi-
cals on the blaze when it crashed about 9 a.m., :
' according to Stuart Cox, a dispatcher with
BLM's Branch of Fire Control in Grand Junc-
tion. Goodman was the only person aboard.
“We don't know why the plane went down,”
Cox said. “An investigative team went into the
trash site today, but it will be some time before
we know anything definite. ”
. Goodman’s body was recovered and taken to
. J i.i .
Western Slope crash
The fire is believed to have been started by
lightning several days ago and to have smolder-
ed until breaking into flames Thursday.
The flames were spotted about 2 p.m. about
five miles east of Grand Valley in an area
wooded with pinons and jumpers.
Cox said several orchards in the area had
been threatened but fire fighters have been
able to prevent any damage.
One television microwave tower did suffer
some damage fiom the blaze, however.
Cox said fire fighters were being hampered
by winds of 10 to 15 miles per hour and that
thunderheads were building late Friday which
could cause further problems.
“The thunderheads make the wind more
erratic, and there could be more lightning,’*
Cox said.
Fire fighters were flown in from a half dozen
western states.
Another smaller fire 1 1 miles east of Grand
Junction was reported under control late
Friday. That fire consumed about 20 acres, and
Cox said about 20 persons would continue fight-
ing it through the night.
■*THE DENVER POST Fr?„ July 16, 1976
t ■ — - ' ' '
300 Working to Contain Tv/o Forest Firesr i
; GRAND JUNCTION, Colo.-Almost 300
men were working Friday to control two
: fires in pinon-pine and juniper country
near here.
One blaze about five miles east of
Grand Valley and south of Interstate 70
had burned about 500 acres. The other,
12 miles east of here, burned about 10
acres.
Stuart Cox, fire dispatcher in the Bu-
reau of Land Management (BLM) office
here, said three airplanes are being
used to drop fire-retardant chemicals ^n l
the blazes. He said fire fighters made no,;
estimates when either fire would bej
controlled. „ , ,|
The fire near Grand Valley is mostly '
on BLM land but has involved some '■
private acreage. The other blaze is con-
fined to BLM land. Both are thought to .-
have been caused by lightning. - . ..j
Cox said erratic winds have hampered.;
the fire-fighting efforts. The fire near ;
here, he said, is in such rugged country
that men must be ferried in by heli- j
copter. • *
- 105 -
Sun., July 13, 1976, Denver, Colo. Rocky Mountain News-
(GranTVaffey
forest fire
kills three
Three fire fighters were killed and a fourth
was seriously burned Saturday when a Western
Slope forest fire exploded as they and others
tried in vain to bring it under control.
The fire, east of Grand Valley, has now con-
sumed 1,000 acres of wooded land and has
claimed four lives. The first victim was the
■ pilot of a slurry bomber which crashed Friday.
The -dead men were identified only as Steve
Furey, Tony Czak and Scott Nelson. The in-
jured man was identified as John Gibson, 27, of
Weilesville, N.Y. He was listed in serious condi-
tion in the intensive care unit of St. Mary’s
Hospital 'n Grand Junction.
A hospital spokesman said Gibson had suffer-
ed second- and third-degree burns over 25 per
cent of his body.
■ Stewart Cox, public information officer for
the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, reported
that a section of the blaze had blown up, caus-
ing an emergency and requiring that medical
. care be called for.
Confirmation of the deaths came from Gar-
’ field County Coroner Orval L. Sowder, who said
the victims were professional fire fighters em-
ployed by the U.S. Forest Service.
■’ There are 280 persons fighting the fire.
Cox said the blaze burned an additional 200
. acres Saturday and was still out of control at
the end of the day. He said it was impossible to
predict when it might be controlled.
Two slurry bombers resumed efforts to stow
. the fire by dropping retardant chemicals on it.
Cox said the two planes made repeated flights
Saturday.
Such flights had been temporarily halted
after Friday’s fatal crash. '
The fire is burning in pinon pine and juniper
■ trees about five miles est of Grand Valley and
south of Interstate 70. The acreage consumed
. so far includes at least 170 acres of private
property.
“It is still burning out of control and moving
. in a northerly, direction, ”. Cox said, die, said hoti
• weather and “high and erratic: winds' ’ ^veredhej
chief factors hampering firefighting efforts. "
„ -- — - - mJWzj.
**THE DENVER POST Sun., July IS, 1976
780 Forest Acres
Continue Burnina
Near Grand Valley
; GRAND JUNCTION, Colo. — Almost 300 fire fighters
•aided by two slurry bombers still were struggling Sat-
urday noon to gain control of a 780-acre forest fire 55
miles northeast of here.
The fire is burning in pinon pine and juniper trees
. on a mountainside five miles east of Grand Valley and
south of Interstate 70.
IT COST THE LIFE Friday morning of Don Good-
man, 5 1, Missoula, Mont., who was killed when his con-
verted B26 bomber smashed into the mountain on a
slurry run. Goodman, a veteran flier, owner the plane
•and had made two runs on the fire the previous day.
The cause of the crash is being investigated.
Friday night, fire fighters expressed hope they could
control the blaze Saturday. But Stuart Cox, fire dis-
patcher in the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) :
Grand Junction office, said Saturday that no lire official
would make a guess when the flames would be in hand.
1 Temperatures have been running in the high 90s,
humidity at less than 20 per cent and the wind erratic
’ in the rugged terrain at 10 to 15 miles per hour. “It’s ,
pretty good fire weather,” Cox said. i
THE FIRE WAS DISCOVERED Thursday afternoon [
and the first guess on its cause was lightning, but that :
also is being investigated, Cox said.
' Of the acreage involved, about 170 acres are privately
owned and the rest is BLM land. Cox said power lines
and a television microwave tower are the only man-
made structures that have been damaged.
; A fire in similar terrain — all on BLM land — 12
miles east of Grand Junction was controlled Friday f
'iter burning about 20 acres.
- 106 -
38-— Rocky Mountain News
Mon,, July 19, 1976, Denver, Colo.
Forest fire fata I to 4 finally
• not rrti.AS krF!t;tz W*
• By DOUGLAS KREUTZ
News Stail
GRAND VALLEY — A forest fire which
claimed four lives and blackened 940 acres
la the rugged western Colorado mountain
country near here was contained by 300
fire fighters late Sunday.
Officials of the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) and Forest Service
said they hoped to bring the fire under con-
trol by Monday morning.
Meanwhile, BLM officials said it wasn’t
known why three of the four men killed in
the blaze failed to evacuate an area believ-
ed about to “blow up" — a fire fighters’
term for a quick and intense fire.
ON SATURDAY, three Forest Service
fire fighters were killed and a fourth was
severely burned when they were trapped
by flame on the side of a canyon wail.
:■ “We knew there was a natural chute up
there, and we knew it was going to blow,"
BLM information officer Roy Johnson said
from the scene Sunday a£ a cold rain dous-
ed the remains of the fire.
“Members of the (20-man) crew in the
area were warned to move out. Most of
them regrouped in a safe area. It’s not
dear what the others were doing or why
they weren’t there"’
! The dead men were identified as Steve
jFurey, 23, of Salmon, Idaho, Tony Czak,
125, of Phoenix, Ariz., and Scott Nelson, 25,
fof Bloomer, Wts.
I The injured man — John Gibson, 27, of
ppcn-vic tims in Alnuguefque, NzM,. [
'♦"The Ol heT f irSTat a I iTy^as'Donakf Good-
man, 58, of Missoula, Mont., who died
Friday when the modified B-26 slurry
plane he was piloting crashed near a ridge
during a flight to drop retardant chemicals
on the fire.
As fire fighters conducted mop-up opera-
tions Sunday afternoon, most appeared
somber about the deaths of their fellows.
None was able to supply details of how the
accidents occurred.
, OTHER MEMBERS of the crew to which
the victims belonged were evacuated from
the fire line and not availaLj? for
„ comment. . -
• f - The blaze, which began Thursday on pri-
-~Vate land, may have been man-caused,
. Johnson said.
* He said the 300 BLM and Forest Service
fire fighters came from several states to
.battle the fire, which consumed pinon pine,.
juniper, oak brush and grasses. Four
slurry bombers and several helicopters
were used in containing the blaze, which
burned out of control until Sundav. •
contained
it,” she said Sunday. “Everything has been
going in our favor today.”
SINCE THE FIRE was first spotted in the
Johnson said a team of investigators From the Battlement Creek area Thursday afternoon.
Boise Inter-agency Fire Center were trying to hot, dry weather and erratic winds have ham-
determine how the men were caught "in the pered control efforts.
blow-up and why the pilot crashed “It’s a very difficult area to get into because
It isn’t known how tong the investigation will if - is vei 7 stee P and hin yJ’ Ms. Archer said,
take, he said. “It’s very hard for the ground crews to work
, ' , „ and the pilots to navigate. The bulldozers are
•'It s tough to tell what happened,” Johnson a j so having trouble and the fire line is being cut
said, ‘ The blow-up was expected and the men mostly by hand as a result ”
were warned. That's ali we know for now.”
Johnson pointed out that morning winds cus- Much of the fire-fighting effort has been di-
tomaniy blow uphill in mountain canyons, then rected from a helicopter over the area,
reverse themseives later in the day. Of the forestland burned, about 170 acres is
Saturday's blow-up, he explained, came in a * " atl0nat
160-acre area in a steep canyon. He said trees ^ •
there had been dried and heated by the morn-
ing winds. When the wind shifted in the after-
noon, and flames reached the timber, it ignited
with explosive speed. I
"To see one of these things is like seeing f
gasoline explode,” he said. ■ . _
HE SAID the deaths were not the worst catas-
trophe in forest fire-fighting history, but that it
' was one of the worst in Colorado. (He cited a
California fire in which nine fire fighters were
kilted.) ;
News clips show the last forest fire-related
death in Colorado occurred in 1964 when a man
was struck by the tail rotor of a helicopter
while fighting a blaze near Eagle.
The top four fire officers — fire boss, plans
chief, service chief and line boss —were reliev-
ed from duty Sunday when the investigation
began, Joneon said,
Johnson said relieving the officers was a rou-
tine procedure and didn't indicate that any of
them had been negligent in their duties. ,
Jack Haslem, who was serving as fire boss
when the deaths occurred, was replaced by
Clair Baldwin.
i
Goodman's was one of three planes dropping
“slurry'” on the fire. The slurry bombing opera-
tions were halted Friday after the crash and
weren't resumed until Saturday. j ~ ■
- Pat Archer, a BLM information officer, said
slurry bombing was again halted at noon on
Sunday to allow fire fighters to bulldoze and
axe their way around the troublesome south-
east comer of the fire. ,
“The rain fell right on the area that needed
- 107 -
GRAND VALLEY, Colo. ~ A forest fire
that has claimed four lives and burned
about 880 acres was contained about 6
p.m. Sunday as nearly 300 fire fighters
established a fire line to prevent further
expansion.
It is expected that all of the hot spots
. will be “knocked out” and that the fire
will be controlled by 8 p.m. Monday,
Lloyd Johnson, a spokesman for the
i Bureau of Land Management (BLM),
. said Monday morning.
A heavy rain Sunday night “cooled
■ down the {ire considerably,” and the hu-
t midity in the fire area was up Monday,
i Johnson said. The fire is in the Battle-
; ment Creek area, about five miles east of
J Grand Valley and 45 miles northeast of
Grand Junction, Colo.
THE FIRE STARTED Thursday and
* damaged a microwave station while rag-
* ing out of control for nearly four days.
The victims of the fire, officials said,
include three fire fighters who apparently
ignored a warning to evacuate a danger-
* ous area and the pilot of a slurry
bomber.
The pilot was identified as Donald
'Goodman, 58, Missoula, Mont,, who was
killed when his plane crashed Friday
while flying outside the fire line with a
load of fire retardant. The plane crash
also created a one-acre fire, Fat Archer,
BLM public information specialist in
Grand Junction, said.
Four fire fighters from the Coconino
National Forest in Arizona were caught
Saturday in a draw when the fire over-
took them from behind. Mrs, Archer said.
The three men who died were identified
by Mrs. Archer as Steve Furey, 23, Salm-
on, Idaho; Tony Czak. 25. Phoenix, Ariz.,
and Scott Nelson, 25. Bloomer, Wis.
THE FOURTH MAN, John Gibson,
Wcllsvillc.. N.Y., was critically injured
and was flown Sunday to the University
of New Mexico Medical Center in
Albuquerque for treatment of bums;' he
suffered over about 25 per cent of -his
body.
The four men, Johnson said, were
members of a crew that was warned to
move out of the dangerous area. Most of
the crew went to a safe area, but it's .not
clear why the four men remained in the
dangerous area. The three deaths still are
being investigated. Johnson said.
About 297 firefighters still were at the
fire scene Monday morning. Johnson said.
BLM officials, he noted, first thought that
the fire was lightning-caused. But Jhe
cause still is being investigated, he said.
The fire is in an area -of oak brush and
juniper forests in mountainous terrain at
an altitude of about 7,000 feet, Johnson
- 108 -
-TN Only Sentinel, Grand Junction, Colorado Hondiy, July 19, 1976 ,
By DON FREDERICK
Sentinel staff writer
GRAND VALLEY - One of the dead-
liest United States forest fires in years
appeared to be coming to an end this
morning in the Battlement Creek area
about five miles southeast of here.
Cooler temperatures and heavy rain-
falls Sunday afternoon and night helped
fire fighters contain the blaze after it
had raged out of control since
Thursday.
Officials with the U.S. Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) anticipated
the fire could be declared “controlled"
.-later today, according to BLM spokes-
: woman Pat Archer. The BLM super-
vises the public land on which most of
the blaze, believed caused by lightning,
occurred.
; Mop-up duties
. According to Mrs. Archer, the fire
originally broke out on private land
sometime Wednesday night or early
! Thursday morning.
This morning, fire-fighting crews
which were flown into Grand Junction
.* and transported to the fire from a num-
ber of Western states, were engaged in
i “mop-up” duties - cooling down the re-
maining smoking spots in the fire area.
. The fire claimed the lives of four fire
fighters and destroyed an estimated 880
acres of mostly scrub oak, pinion pine
and juniper.
The first fatality occurred Friday
r morning when a converted B-26 bomber
spreading fire retardant on the blaze
i crashed on a mountainside. Killed was
; pilot Donald Goodman, 58, of Missoula,
Mont.
. Saturday afternoon, sometime be-
tween 2 and 3 p.m., four fire fighters sta-
tioned with the Coconino National For-
: est in Flagstaff, Ariz., were trapped
. when flames suddenly raced through
unburned scrub oak on a mountain
slope.
■Killed were Tony Czak, 25, of Phoe-
'/ nix, Ariz., Steve Furey, 23, of Salmon,
: Idaho, and Scott Nelson, 22, of Bloomer,
e W«.
in fire
Garfield County Coroner Orville Sow-
der said the three died of suffociation as
oxygen was sucked from the flames
that engulfed them. Rescuers reported
the bodies also were badly burned.
Seriouslv burned in the accident was
John Gibson, 27, of Wellsville, N.Y. Af-
• ter first being treated at St. Mary’s Hos-
pital in Grand Junction, Gibson was
transferred Sunday morning to the Uni-
versity of New Mexico Medical Center
in Albuquerque, which has special facil-
ities for burn victims.
Fair condition
This mprning, Gibson was reported in
fair condition at the hospital, suffering
from second-degree burns on 25 per
cent of his body.
Also reported damaged was a micro-
wave relay station in the Battlement
Creek area. Homes located less than a
mile from where the blaze is believed to
have started sometime Wednesday
night were never threatened since the
fire spread up towards the overlooking
ridges.
Although the acreage burned in the
Battlement Creek blaze was small com-
pared other major U.S. forest fires, the
human toll made it one of the worst in
the memory of veteran fire fighters.
Jack Wilson, director of the Boise
(Idaho) Interagency Fire Center which
coordinated the efforts to fight the Bat-
tlement Creek blaze, could today re-
member only a few other U.S. fires in
the 1970s that resulted in multiple
deaths.
Arnold Hartigan, public affairs direc-
tor for the Boise Interagency Fire Cen-
ter, called the Battlement Creek blaze
“the deadliest in a long time.” He said
the type of accident that claimed the
three fire fighters from Arizona
“doesn't happen very often.”
Investigation team
Federal officials from a variety of
U.S. government agencies have formed
an investigative team and began look-
ing into the accident Sunday. Wilson of
the Boise Interagency Fire Center said
the team included himself and experts 4
!
I
in weather, safety and fire behavior.
Wilson said the investigation would con-
tinue throughout this week.
Jack Haslem, who works with the
Grand Junction BLM office and served
as “fire boss” for the Battlement Creek
blaze, said the three Arizona fire fight-
ers perished during a "blow out” that
occurred Saturday afternoon.
Haslen said fire fighters fear “biow
outs” during the afternoon hours of a
forest fire when a combination of high
temperatures at ground level and winds
can cause a blaze to literaliy “explode”
into an area of unburned fuel.
Haslem said the Arizona crew of fire-
fighters was working Saturday after-
noon above such an area of unburned
scrub oak when the blow out occurred
and four of the crew members became
trapped. Haslem said that in this case
the fire spread over about three-eights
of a mile of scrub oak in about 30 min-
utes.
The tragedy, plus a light thundersho-
wer that passed over the Battlement
Creek area Saturday evening caused
Haslem to remove fire fighters from
the mountainous terrain that night. He
said the fire fighting crews, which num-
bered almost 300 persons, “were a little
nervous.”
Perimeter line
Sunday, the crev/s returned to their
fire fighting chores, finishing construc-
tion of a perimeter line around the blaze
and spreading dirt over remaining “hot
spots.” Helicopters also continued
dumping water over smoking spots in
the fire area.
Officials for the BLM report that al-
ready this year their Grand Junction of-
fice has responded to lOi fires in the
area compared to 33 for the same peri-
od in 1975. . . '
- 109 -
Killer Fire
Believed
Contained
i GRAND VALLEY, Colo,
j (AP) — A forest fire which
; has claimed four lives and has
raged unchecked through
mountain woods since Thurs-
day was believed contained on
, Sunday night.
, A spokeswoman for the Bu-~
reau of Land Management,
Patricia Archer, said fire
crews were expected to con-
trol the blaze on Monday. She
' set the size of the fire, origi-
nally estimated to have black-
ened 1,000 acres of heavily
forested land, at 880 acres.
Mrs. Archer said crews set-
ting up a fire line around the
blaze were aided by sporadic
rains, falling temperatures
and fading winds.
“We had a favorable day,’’
Mrs. Archer said. “It would
take some pretty erratic
weather for it to get away
from us this time.’’
On Saturday, fire officials
thought they had the blaze con-
tained, but gusty winds fanned
the flames out of control, she
said.
Up to 265 firefighters have
joined to effort to halt the fire,
which may have been caused
by lightning.
Three U.S. Forest Service
employes from the Coconino
National Forest near Flag-
staff, Ariz., were killed in the
fire Saturday, and a fourth fire
fighter was critically burned.
The fourth fatality was a pi-
lot whose plane crashed while
he was dropping a fire retar-
dant on the flames.
Mrs. Archer said the deaths
• ' of the Forest Service em-
ployes were under investiga-
tion. Garfield County Coroner
Orvat Sowder said the three
suffocated.
g
§
0
§
1
p
p-
w
w
I
C/2
- 110 -
GRAND VALLEY, Cob. — (AP) — A
U.S. Forest Service employe who was
severely burned while fighting a raging'
forest fire near here said Monday he
received no warning that the blaze might
blow up on him and three others.
“I had a radio and another man in (he
group had a radio, but I heard no warn-
ing,” John Gibson, 27, said in a telephone
interview from an Albuquerque, N.M.,
. hospital where he was being treated for
burns over 25 per cent of his body.
GIBSON, of Wells vi lie, N.Y., was trans-
ferred from Grand Junction to Albuquer-
que on Sunday'.
“We all got down on the ground and
used the survival methods we’d been
taught,” Gibson said. “I was lying right
next to the others when the fiames passed
over us. I was praying awfully damn
fast.”
The 830-acre fire was brought under
control Monday. Some of the 297
firefighters were being sent home Tues-
day.
Earlier, the U.S. Bureau of Land Man-
agement said fire fighters were warned
by radio to move out of the danger area
before the three men were killed and Gib-
son injured. Officials said the three suf-
focated as the wind-driven inferno swept
over them.
HOWEVER, Jack Wilson, chief of a
team conducting an investigation to deter- •
mine how the men died, declined to com-
ment on whether a warning had been
issued pending completion of the probe. ?
A veteran pilot also was killed in the
fire. His plane crashed Friday while
dropping a load of retardant on the blaze.
Ill-
At forest firp qitp
8
I
li
i* i ©in
By DON FREDERICK
Sentinel staff writer
GRAND VALLEY - The U.S. Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) has begun
efforts to rehabilitate and eventually re-
vegetate almost 900 acres of land de-
stroyed in a forest fire about five miles
southeast of here.
Meanwhile, various federal officials
today were continuing investigations in-
to the cause of theblaze, which is believ-
ed to have started sometime Wednes-
day on private property, and an
accident in which three fire fighters
died after being caught in burning
brush.
The fire, which occupied about 300
fire fighteis from throughout the West,
was declared “controlled” by BLM offi-
cials Monday. The fire had burned out
of control until Sunday when heavy rain-
fall in the Grand Valley area gave fire
fighters the chance to contain it.
About 140 fire fighters left from
Grand Junction Monday night for their
' homes and about 80 more were to leave
•. today, according to BLM spokeswoman
Pat Archer.
i Close up camp
i The remaining fire fighters have be-
gun to close up the camp erected last
Week about a mile from the fire area
and aid in the initial reclamation being
performed on the destroyed land, Mrs.
Archer said.
* Stewart Wheeler, a BLM manager in
whose area the fire occurred, said a
team was formed this morning to over-
see the reclamation project.
Wheeler said bulldozers have already
started “water barring” some of the
land to divert the flow of water and re-
duce erosion.
The BLM eventually hopes to reseed
the estimated 880 acres of scrub oak,
pinion pine, juniper and various
grasses destroyed by the fire, Wheeler
said. About 710 acres of this land is un-
der BLM supervision and had been used
for cattle grazing, Wheeler said. The re-
gaining 170 acres burned by the fire is
privately owned.
Officials for a number of federal
agencies, including the Boise ( Idaho ) In-
teragency Fire Center, the National
Weather Service and the BLM, were
meeting in Grand Junction this morn-
ing as part of an investigation into the
deaths Saturday of three young men
from a fire fighting crew stationed with
the Coconino N ational Forest near Flag-
staff, Ariz.
Trapped by flames
The three men - Steve Furey, 23. of
Salmon, Idaho, Tony Czak, 25, of Phoe-
nix, Ariz., and Scot Nelson, 22, of Bloo-
mer, Wis. - perished when they were
trapped by a sudden surge of flames up
a canyon wall.
A fourth member of the crew, John
Gibson, 27, of Wellsville, N.Y., suffered
second-degree burns on 25 per cent of
his body and was reported today in fair
condition at the Burn and Trauma Unit
of the University of New Mexico Medi-
cal Center in Albuquerque.
One aspect of the accident in-
vestigators are looking into is whether
the four men had been warned to leave
the canyon, which contained unburned
foliage fire fighters had feared would
suddenly burst into flames during the
intense heat and high winds Saturday
afternoon.
According to the Associated Press,
Gibson told newsmen Monday that he
and his three fellow fire fighters had not
been toid to leave the area or warned of
the danger.
Gibson declined to accept a telephone
call from The Sentinel today about this
report. A nurse at the Albuquerque hos-
pital said Gibson was receiving calls on-
ly from relatives.
The remaiming 16 members of the
crew from the Coconino National For-
est were removed from the fire scene
and flown home immediately following
the accident. Investigators say they
have been interviewing these crew
members this week.
A pilot from Missoula, Mont., who
was flying a converted B-26 bomber
spreading fire retardant on the blaze -
died when his plane crashed on a moun-
tainside Friday. The four fatalities
caused a federal fire fighting official to
call the fire “the deadliest in a long
time."
team have refused to comment about
the details surrounding Saturday’s acci-
dent until their investigation is com-
plete.
The four top officials supervising the
fighting of the fire were replaced by a
new team Sunday. However, Mrs. Arch-
er of the BLM said such a change in
command was “routine” and was not
related to Saturday’s accident. She said
those supervising the fighting of a for-
est fire rarely get any rest and are “ex-
hausted” after two or three days. The
original command team for the Grand
Valley area fire had arrived at the
scene Thursday.
BLM officials originally believed the
forest fire was caused by lightning
which had caused a number of other mi-
ror fires in the Grand Valley area
Wednesday.
Today, however, an investigative
team was looking into the possibility
the larger fire was man-caused.
Mrs. Archer said these suspicions
were aroused because the fire began in
a lower elevation than lightning usually
strikes in the Valley area.
Mrs. Archer said today that though a
portion of the acreage destroyed by the
fire was privately owned, it is .normal
procedure for the BLM to rehabilitate
all the land destroyed in a forest fire
that involves federal property.
Various experts
Wheeler of the BLM said the reclama-
tion team formed today includes ex-
perts in wildlife, water sheds and range
conservation. He said he is hopeful res-
seding of the burned land can occur this
fall. He also noted that not all the grass
roots in the burned area may have been ’
destroyed in the fire and so could re-
vegetate naturally.
After examining the burned area this
week, the BLM is to apply for federal
funds for the reclamation projject.
Wheeler said. Such a request must be :
approved by Congress. Wheeler could I
give no estimate of the possible cost of
the reclamation project.
j Refused to comment
^Members of the federal investigative
■ - 112 -
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Denver's Morning Newspaper
ReTlhS.Pot.Off. Colorado's
Mews
Firs! Newspaper — Founded in 1 859
METfiO
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Warm, cloudy
, D*l*‘f5,
15'
96 PACKS
11 8IH YEAR, NO. 89 s« DENVER, COLORADO 8020 1 , TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1976
Sin
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I
By DOUGLAS k'REUTZ
Stuff
The sole survivor of a forest fire blow
up — a wind-driven inferno that killed
throe fire fighters near Grand Valley
Saturday — said Monday he received no
warning from fire observers that danger
was imminent.
“f had a radio and another man in the
group had a radio, but I heard no warn-
ing,” said John Gibson, 27, in a telephone
interview from an Albuquerque hospital
where he is receiving treatment for burns
over 25 per cent of his body.
“We all got down on the ground and used
the survival methods we'd been taught,"
Gibson told the News. " I was lying right
next to the others when the flames passed
over us. I was praying awfully damn fast. ”
Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
officials at the scene of the fire, which was
declared under controPcariy Monday, told
the News earlier that fire fighters were
warned by radio to move out of the danger
area.
BLM information officer Boy Johnson
said Sunday, “We knevf there was a natu-
ral chute up there, and we knew it was
going to blow. Members of the (20-man)
crew in the area were warned to move out.
Most of them regrouped in a safe area, it's
not clear what Lhe others were doing or
why they weren’t there."
But another BLM spokesman, informa-
tion officer Pat Archer, said Monday offi-
cials hadn’t been able to determine who
had issued a warning — if, in fact, there ‘
was one. . ,
Those killed were identified as Steve
Furey, 23, of Salmon, Idaho; Tony Czak,
25, of Phoenix, Ariz. and Scott Nelson, 25,
of Bloomer, Wis.
A fourth fire fatality was Donald Good-
man, S3, of Missoula, Mont, who died
Friday when the modified B-26 slurry
plane he was piloting crashed during a
flight to drop retardant chemicals on the
fire.
A seven-member investigating team
from the Boise Inter-agency Fire Center
met in Grand Junction Monday to try to
determine how the men died.
Jack Wilson, chief of the investigating
team, said the other 16 members of the
crew in which the deaths ocurred had been
interviewed by investigators, , -»•
Wednesday, July 21 , 1976
The Daily Sentinel. Gtann Junction, Colorado-
ome
By DON FREDERICK
Sentinel staff writer
Three men fighting a forest fire near
Grand Vailey were killed Saturday af-
ter a “fast moving finger of the fire’’
which they did not see coming cut off
their escape route, a preliminary in-
vestigation has determined.
Dale Andrus, director of the U.S. Bu-
reau of Land Management in Colorado,
released the findings of the in-
vestigation to The Sentinel late this
morning.
Andrus said the investigation team
set up to look into the details surround-
ing the fatal accident reported that the
three men killed and a fourth injured
had separated themselves from the rest
of their crew when they were overtaken
by the flames.
Conflict noted
Andrus added there are “conflicting
statements” on whether the four had
been warned by officials in charge of
fighting the fire that they should not
have been in the area where the acci-
dent occurred.
Andrus said the investigation would
continue in hopes of clearing up this con-
‘flict.
The three men, fire fighters with the
Coconino National Forest in /mizona,
perished when they were trapped by a
sudden surge of flames up a canyon
wall. The fourth man was seriously
burned. He is in fair condition at an Al-
buquerque hospital.
Investigators on hand
Andrus read for The Sentinel the re-
port he has received from a special
team of federal fire-fighting officials
who since Saturday have been attempt-
ing to reconstruct the events leading to
the fatalities.
■ The report went as follows: ■
The crew from Arizona first arrived
St the forest fire scene Friday and spent
the day fighting a “critical” portion of
the fire, which broke out Wednesday
about five miles southeast of Grand Val-
ley.'
On Saturday, the crew was ordered to
a rocky ridge to work on a “hand Ime”
that had been constructed around the
perimeter of the fire.
Before the crew set to work, crew
leader Tony Czak, 25, viewed the area
by helicopter. Once on the ground . he or-
' dered 14 members of the crew to widen
, the hand line. Three other crewmen
were ordered by Czak to burn out the
area in front of the hand line to provide
an additional barrier to the fire.
Ordered to leave
About 2:45 p.m., Czak ordered the 14
members working on the hand line out
of the area. Meanwhile, he and the oth-
er three crewmen tried to complete the
burning of the area in front of the hand
fhne. - - --- .
Suddenly, “a fast moving finger of
the fire moved up a steep slope out of
their view and cut off their planned
route of escape,” according to the in-
vesiigation team's report.
Czak notified other crew members by
radio that he and his three companions
were cut off. The four moved along the
burned-out area hoping to escape the
approaching flames. When it became
apparent they would be overrun by the
blaze, the four men doused themselves
with water and lay down in a depres-
sion. The fire engulfed them and their
clothes ignited.
Two already dead
About 10 minutes later a fire fighter
from Glenwood Springs arrived on the
scene. Czak and Scott Nelson, 22, were
already dead. Steve Furey, 23, was still
alive, but died within minutes despite
first-aid efforts at the scene. John Gib-
son, 27, was seriously burned and was
transferred to St. Mary's Hospital in
Grand Junction. On Sunday he was
flown to the Albuquerque hospital.
Andrus said the investigation will con-
tinue to further; determine what hap-
pened, whether a warning had been is-
sued and what factors caused the
sudden flare-up of the fire.
Andrus had originally said he might
not release all the details of the in-
vestigation team's report. He said
Tuesday afternoon he was considering
withholding portions of the report that
might prove prejudicial to future court
cases that may result from the acci-
dent.
Changes decision
But Wednesday morning Andrus said
he decided to release all the informa-
tion he has received so far.
Andrus said, “1 assume law suits are
• going to be filed” concerning the acci-
dent and said he may withhold details
from future reports by the investigation
team.
The Grand Valley area forest fire,
which destroyed about 830 acres of
mostly oak brush grazing range, was
declared officially controlled Monday.
AH out-of-state fire fighters left the
scene Tuesday night. A crew of local
fire fighters 'remained at the scene
today -conducting “mop-up" work, ac-
cording to a Bureau of Land Manage-
tnent spokesmen.
- 114 -
24 — Rocky Mountain News Thurs., July 22, 1976, Denver, Colo.
Lightning apparently caused a fire that
claimed the lives of four fire fighters' and black*
. ened 940 acres of forest land near Grand Valley
in western Colorado.
A report given Wednesday to Dale Andrus,
i Colorado director of the Bureau of Land Man-
agement (BLM), by a seven-member investiga-
' live team from the Boise Inter-agency Fire
■ Center said the team spent two days inlerview-
. ing residents and made a thorough inspection of
the point of origin of the fire and there is no
evidence to indicate the fire was started by
* anything but lightning.
THE DENVER POST
Wed., July 21, 1 97S 23
$LM Report.
On Forest Fire
To 'Hide' Facts
<JRAND JUNCTION, Colo.-(AP)~The
director of the Bureau of Land Managc-
nfent (BLM) in Colorado said on Tuesday
airport was being prepared on a forest
fire which took four Lives last week, but
said many facts concerning the fire
wouldn’t be released. ' ,
• J)ale Andrus said those facts would be J
**Eeld in an attorney-client relationship
ferksafeguard the interests of the injured '
mgn and the families of the three crew
members who were killed in the Battle- *
meht Creek fire.” '
jfhe 880-acre fire near Grand Valley :
■was brought under control Monday after
burning for five days, and final operations
were completed Tuesday afternoon.
3tn interagency seven-man team from •
tbfc BLM and the U.S. Forest Service was
investigating the deaths of three fire- ,
fighters who suffocated when the fire ■
blew up' on them. A fourth man was
severely burned in the incident.
in addition, a veteran pilot was killed .
when his plane crashed while dropping
,'rejardant on the blaze.
Earlier, the BLM said the four fire- -
fighters had been warned to move from
the area before the fire got to them. But
the' injured man said he had received no
• radio warning.
jAndrus said he expected to have results *
. of^'the investigation by next week. •
Earlier published reports indicated the fire
may have been causes by carelessness at an
outdoor party, but those reports were errone-
ous, according to a BLM spokesman.
“That report originated from an off-the-cuff
remark made by a BLM official,” the spokes-
man said.
When the final report is made, officials hope
to see if anyone was at fault for not warning
four men caught in a sudden surge of wind-
blown fire that swept over them.
Three of the men, Steve Furey, 23, of Salmon,
Idaho; Tony Czak, 25, of Phoenix, Ariz., the
team leader, and Scott Nelson, 25, of Bloomer,
Wis., were killed
A fourth fire fighter, John Gibson, 27, of
Welisville, N.Y., is being treated in the Univer-
sity of New Mexico Medical Center in Albu-
querque for burns on about 25 per cent of his
body.
. Last Friday, slurry bomber pilot Don Good-
man, 58, of Missoula, Mont., was killed when
his plane crashed during a slurry run.
■f
- 115 -
FOLLOWUP ACTION RELATING TO UNUSUAL FUEL CONDITIONS
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
FOREST SERVICE
WO
reply to: 5100 Fire Management
subject: Extreme Fire Behavior Conditions
TO: Regional Foresters, Region 2, 3 and 4
AUG 1 6 1976
The enclosed report and memorandum clearly explain an unusual fire
behavior situation. The importance of this information became
evident during investigation of the fatalities on the Battlement
Creek Fire near Grand Junction, Colorado.
Please assure that line officers are aware of this potential problem.
The information should also be shared with State Foresters in the
affected areas. All fire teams assigned to fires must be cognizant
of this unusual situation and not count on normal fire intensities
and rates of spread.
/
While this matter relates particularly to frost dieback in Gambel 1 s
Oak, you should be alert for different conditions caused by other
unusual events. Only through careful, thorough attention to the
1 o c a 1 t ua t i oh can future problems be averted.
/A
77' fA '
/ JOHN R. <J McGUIRE
Chief
Enclosure
cc: Regional Foresters, R-l thru 10
- 116 —-
August 6, 1976
EXTREME FIRE BEHAVIOR CONDITIONS NOW EXIST IN FROST-
DAMAGED BRUSH FUELS
The purpose of this report is:
1. To alert wildland fire management agencies in Colorado and
adjacent states regarding the current potential for extreme rates of
fire spread in brush stands that suffered leaf mortality, due to a
frost, on June 14, 1976, in Colorado.
2. To request that land managers thoroughly brief fire crews
and overhead teams regarding any local fuel conditions that might
accelerate rates of spread or increase fire intensities (should
consider possible drought, insect, and disease effects in addition
to frost-induced dieback) .
3. To provide background information on the nature of fire
behavior conditions in frost-damaged oak stands.
On July 15, Jack Wilson, BLM Director at BIFC, made a helicopter
reconnaissance flight to evaluate frost-killed fuels on the west
slope of Colorado in the. Grand Junction area (see his attached July 16
memorandum .to the State Director, BLM, Colorado), On June 14, the
temperature at Grand Junction was 32°F., 28°F. at Rifle, and probably
in the 24°F. range above 7,000 feet elevation. This frost caused
widespread mortality to the leaves of Gambel's oak. Other species
affected were snowberry, mountain mahogany, aspen, and Douglas-fir.
As of late July, 50 percent or more of the Gambel's oak leaves in
affected stands were dead and retained in the shrub crowns. Shed
oak leaves contributed to a 1-2 inch litter layer on the ground.
The day of Wilson's flight, July 15, the stage was already being set
to demonstrate a significant fire behavior episode in frost-damaged
Gambel's oak. The Battlement Creek Fire, 40 miles northeast of Grand
Junction, Colorado, made major runs on the afternoons of July 15,
16 and 17. On the afternoon of July 17, three members of an Inter-
regional firefighting crew were overrun and killed by a fire that
burned rapidly in frost-damaged Gambel's oak on a steep, west facing
aspect. Slope percentages in the draw immediately below the crew
ranged from 50 to 75 percent.
- 117 -
2
The single most significant weather event that affected the Battlement
Creek Fire was extensive frost that occurred one month prior to the
fire !
Fuel moisture sample on the Battlement Creek Fire were collected at 1830
on July 20 at 8800 feet on the ridge above the fire area:
Sample Average Moisture Content (%)
Dead oak leaves (shrub canopy)
11.4
Leaf litter on ground
13.7
Dead oak branches (< % inch)
12.4
Green oak leaves
166.5
Living oak stems (< k inch )
193.8
The dead oak leaves in the shrub canopy could have been at 7-8 percent
moisture content or less at the time of the fire run on Saturday,
July 17.
The June frost significantly increased the amount of available fuel in
the Battlement Creek area by contributing to the dieback of the oak
leaves. One individual remarked that fire behavior conditions seemed
2-3 weeks early for this time of year.
Chemical analyses of the Gambel's oak leaves were conducted at the
Northern Forest Fire Laboratory in Missoula:
Green Leaves Dead Leaves in Crown
Crude fat (%) ^
1.60
.52
Total ash {%)
3.18
2.50
Low heat of combustion
(Btu/lb) 1
7886
7782
The crude fat content, or amount of volatile waxes, oils, and resins,
was quite low in Gambel's oak. Much lower than the 8-12 percent
reported for southern California chaparral. Therefore, the significant
fire behavior fact was the great increase in amount of available fuel
in the Gambel’s oak crowns due to frost damage. Fuel chemistry did not
play the important role on the west slope of Colorado that it does in
California .
Samples were not frozen. Escape of volatiles might tend to make
these values low.
- 118 -
3
Chaparral Model Nomograph Results
Site conditions on the Battlement Creek Fire on Saturday afternoon
were run using the chaparral fuel model 1 of the National Fire-Danger
Rating System with nomographs designed to predict fire spread,
intensity, and flame length. Two different windspeeds (15 and 25 mph)
and 2 slope percents (40 and 75) were used in the calculations. Dead
fuel moisture was set at 5.5 percent and live fuel moisture at 150
percent.
Nomograph results:
Condition
#1
£2
#3
Windspeed (mph)
15
15
25
Slope (percent)
40
60
75
Effective wind (mph)
Reaction intensity (Btu/min/ft“)
17
18
29
12,000
12,000
12,000
Rate of spread (ch/hr)
110
125
240
Flame length (ft)
o
ro
i
o
CM
20-30
30-40
Fireline intensity (Btu/sec/ft)
5500
6000
12,000
Time to go h. mile (min)
24
21
11
Time to go 3/4 mile (min)
36
32
16.5
Conditions 1, 2, and 3 show the fire traveling mile in 11 to 24
minutes. In reconstructing actual fire spread from photographs and
observations, it appears that the fire traveled the last 1800 feet
to the saddle in about 15 minutes. In terms of fireline intensity,
100 Btu/sec/ft of fireline is. about at the upper limit for control
by hand crews and 500 to 700 Btu/sec/ft for direct control of a fire
by any forces. Fireline intensities for cases #1, #2, and #3 were
5500, 6000, and 12,000 Btu/sec/ft, respectively, or absolutely un-
controllable!
Fire Behavior Appraisal
A rather typical weather pattern, steep mountainous terrain, and
frost -induced dieback in Gambel's oak established conditions for
high rates of fire spread in the Battlement Creek drainage duriiig
afternoon hours. For these reasons there might be a tendency to
equate the Battlement Creek Fire with a southern California brush
fire, but such was not quite the case. Precipitation amounts were
near normal for this time of year, humidities were not unusually
low, and wind velocities generally fell far short of Santa Ana
conditions. Green fuel moistures for oak leaves and stems were
166 percent and 194 percent, respectively, well above the 60 per-
cent moisture contents recorded for drought-stressed chaparral In
— Fire danger rating system fuel model B was selected because it came
closest to representing brush conditions on the Battlement Creek
Fire.
- 119 -
4
California.. Nevertheless, dead oak leaves on the ground and in the
crowns, abundant fine dead branches in the oak and mountain mahogany
crowns, the dense arrangement of 6-12 foot shrubs, and slopes ranging
from 50 to 75 percent provided all the potential necessary for a fast
spreading, high intensity fire,
A prophetic report prepared by the Colorado State Forest Service^ j_ n
1974 described a "fuel type X" that supports high-to-severe wildfire
hazards. (This report should be required reading for all fire manage-
ment agencies in Colorado.) These primarily oakbrush fuels "are
dense, high brush 1% to 10 feet in height- Small scattered patches
of conifer or deciduous trees or scattered individual trees may also
exist but are of minor effect and occurrence. The fuels are continuous
or nearly so. Despite heavy shading, the ground is seldom damp.
Flammability may vary markedly in the year due to changes in fuel
moisture and leaf fall. Fire seldom kills these species. Many re-
sprout after fires with more stems resulting in more numerous, thin-
stemmed fuels than before."
Burning characteristics are described as becoming "extra hazardous
during special times of the year. The critical time of year varies
with the species. For example, oakbrush is very difficult to burn
when the leaves are green, but when its leaves are brown and still
hanging on the branches, it becomes one of Colorado's most flammable
fuels for 2 to 7 > weeks in autumn." The key point here is that these
highly flammable autumn conditions in oakbrush existed in the Battle-
ment Creek drainage in mid-July due to the June 14 frost!
The report clearly described many of the events observed in the
Battlement Creek Fire!
"The "X" fuels support medium to high intensity fires, short-
range spot fires are common, rate of spread is moderate to fast,
flare-ups brief but common and hot, just-burned area is tenable
by humans within about V hour, the fire front is impassable.
Brush fires seldom burn throughout the night and into the next
day if suppression action is made.
"The areas are of state interest due to the associated burning
characteristics, the difficulty of fire suppression and the
resultant dangers to life and property during special times.
By their very nature "X" fuels often create a false sense of
security due to their lush greenness and sometimes non-flammable
periods. Many people find it impossible to believe the potential
— Guidelines and Criteria for Wildfire Hazard Areas, Sept. 1974,
Colorado State Forest Service, Fort Collins, Colorado.
- 120 -
5
flammability until they witness burning in critical periods.
Its (oakbrush) rate of fire spread has been observed and
timed to be an incredible 16 acres per minute, steady for
3 hours, in Colorado! Fast running mule deer have been
found dead in oakbrush burns --unable to outrun the fire's
spread. Brush fires are very sensitive to wind direction.
Property and lives considered safe on a flank can be quickly
threatened within minutes by a: wind shift."
So Colorado oakbrush need not be compared to California chaparral
fuel types. Under the July conditions of frost-induced dieback in
Gambol ' s oak in Battlement Creek, the oak stands on its own as a
most potent fuel type!
Robert W. Mutch
Research Forester
Intermountain Forest and
Range Experiment Station
-121
I
JN REPLY REFER TO
United States Department of the Interior
BUREAU OF LA NO MANAGEMENT
Boise Interagency Fire Center
3905 Vista Avenue
Boise, Idaho 83705
9210 (100)
July 16, 1976
Memorandum
To: State Director, Colorado
From: BLM Director-BIFC
Subject: Evaluation of Fuels on the West Slope of Colorado
Subject to your request, I flew to your West Slope Fire Center at Grand
Junction on July 14. There I met Byron Kropf and Doug Gregory of the
Colorado State Office and Roy Johnson of the Grand Junction District.
On July 15, Byron and I flew extensive areas by helicopter after having
determined these were probably the more critical areas based on a fixed
wing flight on July 14.
The imminent problem is caused by the fact that on June 14, 1976, a
very hard killing frost occurred across most of the West Slope of
Colorado. A temperature of 32° was recorded at Grand Junction, and
Rifle recorded 28°. In the area above 7,000 feet, this temperature
probably got down in the 24° range. The frost caught particularly the
oak brush at a very vulnerable early leaf and bud stage. Above the
10,000 foot elevation, it appears the aspen was also heavily damaged.
Above 8,500 feet, there is evidence of damage to the snowberry and
mahogany .
The following details are essentially the observations that were made
on the July 15 helicopter flight.
The helicopter flight took us southwest of Grand Junction to an area
of a prior fire, "Granite Creek." We landed at the 8,000 foot level and
examined the oak brush and snowberry stands. It appeared that 25 to 30
percent of the oak brush had been severely affected. On an individual
plant basis, most of the secondary and tertiary branches were dead.
The leaves were desiccated, and 90 percent had fallen to the ground.
There was perhaps a two-inch ground cover in the thicker areas where
the leaves had shed. Perhaps ten percent of the snowberry had been
nipped and their leaves were like parchment. We dug into the oak root
system and even the smaller feeder roots appeared to be alive. The
7,500 foot elevation seemed to be a critical level. The damaged areas
exhibited no particular pattern in this area but did seem to follow
..conserve
^AM ERICA'S
ENEROY
“122- .
2
typical drainage flow channels. Pinon juniper exhibited a fairly
solid canopy and was fairly dry for this time of year.
We then proceeded east of Gateway to the south of Montrose into the
Powderhorn area. Here the frost damage was much more severe.' Up to
80 percent of the area appeared affected. In this area generally, the
oak leaves had not fallen from the trees. Time precluded spending much
time in this area and we did not land, but I expect the individual
plant situation would be similar to the Granite Creek fire area except
that there may be some mortality in the primary stalks.
We then flew northward to an area perhaps 35 miles north of the
Gunnison Gorge and proceeded westward into Grand Junction, flying south
over Rifle and over the Book Cliffs area. The area around Rifle appear
to be damaged at about the 50 percent level. I would liked to have
gotten into the Douglas Pass area since there appeared to be consider-
able damage in that area.
There is a large area between 7,500 feet and 9,500 feet north of the
Gunnison Gorge that is affected but of probably more concern to the
Bureau of Land Management is the apparent damage to the lodgepole pine
in draws feeding into the Gunnison Canyon Reservoir. Damage appears
extensive on both sides of the reservoir and is either a very serious
beetle infestation or a frost desiccation. While I expect this might
be the "gray, forest" stage in lodgepole pine, it needs to be field
examined to determine if, in fact, these trees are dying and if so,
then the field problem is greatly magnified.
Upon returning to Grand Junction, I made some cursory analysis of the
long range situation. Most of the West Slope had a very mild winter.
Two large April storms brought substantial moisture to the area and
the Palmer Drought Index indicates very near to the normal range.
Since May the area has had very limited moisture but this is not too
abnormal. However, computer runs of the AFFIRMS program are .showing
some interesting comparisons. Comparative runs of the ignition index
(which is a pretty good one for light fuels) shows readings that are
consistently worse than those that have been recorded in the past.
The same kind of comparisons for energy release indexes were indicat-
ing about the same thing.
From a fire standpoint, the West Slope Fire Center has been responding
to about three times the normal number of fires, and in the 6,000 plus
elevations, they Have had difficulty with spotting in fairly sparse
pinon juniper stands. At this time, they have not yet had a fire in
the oak brush areas.
- 123 -
3
The State Office has caused a fair buildup in the initial attack
capability with the view of getting the fires early. The basic
strategy of the initial attack complement has been very effective so
far. To date the initial attack crews have done an excellent job in
coping with the overload fire situation.
Summary and Conclusions :
1. The West Slope of Colorado was subjected to an abnormal hard
frost on June 14, 1976. It caught particularly the oak brush at a
very vulnerable stage and has affected snowberry and mountain mahogany
in the higher elevations.
2. Nature has provided an exceptionally rigorous pruning job to most
of the affected plants. My cursory estimate on an individual plant
basis is that, where affected, about 40 percent of the plant is
damaged. In some areas the leaves have fallen to the ground; in
other areas, this has not occurred. As long as the fuel is in the
air, it is more dangerous from the ladder effect, but when it falls
to the ground, there is a dangerous ground cover.
3. Much of the heavier fuels on BLM lands, pinon juniper in
particular, is already dry. It Is running about a month; ahead of
normal. The "pinon smell," which is an indicator of flashiness, has
already been noted and, in fact, has been causing spot fires that
normally should not occur in fairly sparse stands.
4. The West Slope of the Colorado is facing a very dangerous fire
situation because of the extra volume of fuel and the drying condi-
tions and the possibility for ladder effect, particularly in the oak
brush areas. My sampling was of necessity very spotty and cursory
and I could not assess potential wildlife or grazing implications
but there is a very dangerous fire situation developing because of the
added fuel load.
5. Of vital interest and concern to BLM but not a direct responsi-
bility is the vast area of bug killed spruce and lodgepoie now com-
pounded by damage to the aspen and mountain brush encompassed a large
area bounded roughly by a triangle involving Meeker, Kremmling and
Delta and including the Gunnison River drainage. This would involve
parts of the Routt, White River, and Uncompagre National Forests.
6. From a suppression standpoint, there is in place a reasonably
strong initial attack force at Grand Junction. It is essentially,
however, a "loaner" organization made up of USFS smoke jumpers, BIFC
- 124 -
4
personnel and aircraft, and Alamosa crews. There should be a regular
complement to staff and manage this complex operation, particularly the
air operation. A critical point to remember is that the worst of the
fire season is yet to come. There is going to be a normal and continu-
ing operation for the next few years and this force, in my view, is
perhaps conservative. They may be faced with added fuel loading for
several years which might need augmented support,
7. For this particular season, I would recommend that any fire that s
exceeds 50 acres in oak brush fuels is a- potential project fire and i
assistance should be requested for any fires that exceed this limita- f
tion when containment has not been achieved by initial attack.
cc:
Hr, Max Peterson
USFS-USDA
Programs and Legislation
Washington, D.C.
WO 440
☆ U.S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976-696-323/229
-125
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